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crime, n. [OFr. crime; L. crimen, an accusation, 
fault, crime, from cernere; Gr. krinein, to 
decide, judge] an act committed in violation of a 
law prohibiting it, or omitted in violation of a 
law ordering it. 
cheat, v.t. [M.E. cheten, to confiscate, seize] to 
deceive and defraud in a bargain; to deceive for 
the purpose of gain ... 1 
Sometimes cheating is a crime; sometimes it is not. 
Cheating occurs when a rule is broken. When the rule is 
established and enforced through the legal system, cheating 
is a crime. There are, however, many rules that do not 
originate in the legislature. An example of rule breaking 
that is not a crime is the cheating that plagues cartels. 
Cartels adopt rules (usually in the form of quotas for 
members) that advance the interests of the group. The rules 
restrict competition, reduce output, raise price, and 
increase the profits of the voluntary association. Once 
competition has been reduced, each individual member has an 
incentive to cheat on the cartel agreement; an increase in 
output by one firm, the output of other firms constant, 
increases the cheater's share of cartel (monopoly) profits. 
Cartel theory emphasizes the difficulty of detecting and 
1Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, {1983) 2nd 
ed., Simon and Schuster, New York. 
1 
deterring cheating as the source of instability in cartels. 2 
While cartels tend to be unstable organizations, some manage 
to persist in spite of the inherent instability caused by 
cheating. One cartel that has managed to survive is the 
National Collegiate Athletics Association. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
Formed in 1906 as the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States, the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) began with the stated purposes: 
The regulation and supervision of college athletes 
throughout the United State in order that the 
athletic activities in the colleges and 
universities may be maintained on an ethical plane 
in keeping with the dignity and high moral purpose 
of education. 3 
While the initial impetus for its formation was the 
reduction of violence in intercollegiate football, the NCAA 
has evolved into an organization charged with many 
responsibilities. The NCAA's influence has grown to include 
virtually every aspect of intercollegiate sports. Formally, 
the organization's purposes are: 
o To initiate, stimulate and improve 
intercollegiate athletics programs for 
student-athletes and to promote and develop 
educational leadership, physical fitness, 
2 See, for example, Demsetz {1968) and Stigler (1971) 
for a discussion of the "Chicago school" approach. 
3 As quoted in Arthur A. Fleisher III, Brian L. Goff, 
and Robert D. Tollison The NCAA: A Study in Cartel Behavior 
University of Chicago 1992 p. 41 
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athletics excellence and athletics 
participation as a recreational pursuit. 
o To uphold the principle of institutional 
control of, and responsibility for, all 
intercollegiate sports in conformity with the 
constitution and bylaws of the Association. 
o To encourage its members to adopt eligibility 
rules to comply with satisfactory standards 
of scholarship, sportsmanship, and 
amateurism. 
o To formulate, copyright and publish rules of 
play governing intercollegiate athletics. 
o To preserve intercollegiate athletics 
records. 
o To supervise the conduct of, and to establish 
eligibility standards for, regional and 
national athletics events under the auspices 
of the Association. 
o To legislate, through bylaws or by 
resolutions of a Convention, upon any subject 
of general concern to the members related to 
the administration of intercollegiate 
athletics. 
o To study in general all phases of competitive 
intercollegiate athletics and establish 
standards whereby the colleges and 
universities of the United States can 
maintain their athletics programs on a high 
level. 4 
The NCAA now includes more than 1,000 member colleges, 
universities, athletic conferences, individuals and 
organizations. The colleges that make up the NCAA compete 
in three divisions, each with its own membership criteria. 
The athletic competition that occurs in the three divisions 
include 96 championships administered by the NCAA. 
To the basic regulation and supervision of college 
athletics, economists would add restricting competition, 
4The NCAA, National College Athletic Association, 
Pamphlet No. 8937-10/92, p. 3. 
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distribution of cartel rents, and monopsonistic exploitation 
of resource suppliers to the list of NCAA functions. From 
recruiting to television revenue-sharing, the NCAA sets 
rules that govern activity in both input and output markets. 
The output of the NCAA is sports entertainment. The labor 
of student-athletes represents an important input in the 
production of sports entertainment. The NCAA attempts to 
exert market power in both of these markets. While its 
power in the output market has been limited by the courts, 
the NCAA is an effective buyer's cartel in the input 
market. 5 As a resource market cartel , the NCAA attempts to 
eliminate price competition for the services of student-
athletes, thereby reducing the prices paid for these crucial 
inputs and lowering production costs. The NCAA has very 
detailed regulations about what student-athletes can be 
offered for their services. It is in the compensation of 
student-athletes that the cheating that characterizes cartel 
agreements usually arises in the intercollegiate athletics 
cartel. 
Cheating in the NCAA 
The NCAA and the "cheating" that occurs in college 
athletics is an excellent case study in cartel behavior. As 
5See Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma et 
al. v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (1982). 
The decision in this case limited the monopoly power of the 
NCAA with respect to television revenues. 
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a voluntary association of colleges and universities, the 
NCAA regulates college athletics. While this regulation is 
supposed to promote athletic competition, it also restricts 
economic competition in product and resource markets. Like 
the members of any cartel, the NCAA member schools are 
repeatedly found in violation of cartel rules. John F. 
Rooney Jr. reports on the cheating that occurs in college 
athletics in The Recruiting Game. From 1952 to 1985, the 
NCAA placed over 150 schools on football or basketball 
probation for violations of NCAA rules. In 1984 a study by 
the NCAA suggested that 30 per cent of Division I schools 
cheat. In fact, Rooney quotes Walter Byers, the NCAA 
executive director at the time as saying, "There seems to be 
a growing number of coaches and administrators who look upon 
NCAA penalties as the price of doing business--if you get 
punished that's unfortunate, but that's part of the cost of 
getting along" (Rooney, p. 14 7) . 6 
While violating NCAA rules is not a "crime", the 
distinction is superfluous. The identity of the rule maker 
(the NCAA, OPEC, the legislature, etc.) does not alter the 
motives of the rule breaker. Rules are broken for 
individual gain. This is the theoretical foundation of the 
6This quote underscores a basic contradiction in the 
NCAA's activities. On one level, the NCAA strives to keep 
college athletics compatible with academia. On another 
level, college athletics is a business that primarily 
benefits athletic, and not academic, interests. 
5 
economic approach to crime and punishment. It follows then, 
that the methodologies developed in the economics of crime 
literature are applicable to any form of rule breaking, 
including and especially, violations of NCAA rules. The 
relevance of this approach is implicit in the manner in 
which the NCAA responds to rules violations. The 
Infractions Committee uses the same process as the criminal 
justice system: rule violations are reported, the 
allegations are investigated, the defendant(s) are judged, 
and punishment is meted out to those found guilty. 7 
The NCAA, Market structure, and Cheating 
Industrial organization economists have long pondered 
the effect of market structure on market performance. The 
structure-conduct-performance approach introduced by Mason 
(1939, 1949) and promulgated by Bain (1959), established a 
framework for economic analysis. The oligopoly market 
structure (a few firms with significant market share) 
suggests a decision made by any one oligopolist will depend 
on the actions and decisions of the other oligopolists. 
When such an environment leads to collusion, a cartel is 
formed. Thus, the oligopoly structure gives rise to 
collusive conduct which affects market performance. One of 
7 It should be noted that the process by which NCAA 
violations are evaluated must conform with the standards of 
due process prescribed for formal criminal justice 
procedures. 
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the central problems facing any cartel is the incentive of 
member firms to cheat on the cartel agreement. Cheating by 
member firms is simply another aspect of the conduct 
predicted by market structure. It can be argued, then, that 
market structure will affect cheating within the cartel. 
The NCAA offers a unique opportunity for those 
interested in cartel behavior, especially in the area of 
cheating on cartel agreements. The NCAA is a multi-market 
cartel producing sports entertainment via a number of sports 
markets--the more "popular" products being collegiate 
football and basketball. While each of the sports markets 
are regulated under the same basic NCAA regulations, each 
operates under fundamentally different market conditions. 
To illustrate, consider the football, basketball, and 
baseball markets. If these three sports were organized in a 
pyramid according to the degree of monopsony power 
exemplified in each, football would be at the base (because 
it exemplifies the highest degree of monopsony power), 
basketball would be in the middle, and baseball would be on 
top. If a student-athlete possessed equal skills in each of 
these three sports, he or she would face different labor 
market conditions depending on the employment choice made. 
If the athlete decided to pursue a career in baseball, more 
options would be available to him versus a career in 
football. This is true because of the differing degrees of 
monopsony power in each of the markets. A professional 
7 
football career nearly always requires collegiate play; a 
professional baseball career can begin immediately after 
high school. A professional career in basketball can (under 
hardship rules) sometimes begin without collegiate 
experience. Thus, the degree of monopsony power 
differentiates these three sports within the cartel. These 
two characteristics of the collegiate sports cartel, 
multiple and heterogeneous markets, are the basis for this 
dissertation. The unique market conditions under which 
college athletic departments operate provide an opportunity 
to link the economics of crime with cartel theory. 
overview of the Dissertation 
As prompted by the previous discussion, this 
dissertation will examine the relationship between market 
structure and cheating. Specifically, the problem to be 
attacked is the following: does monopsony power affect the 
amount of cheating? Investigating this question requires 
behavioral information from two areas of economic research. 
The economics of crime provides insight into why economic 
actors cheat. Cartel theory describes the behavior of the 
cartel under different structural circumstances. Linking 
these two areas of economic analysis is the key to solving 
the problem posed above. 
The results of this investigation are organized into 
five chapters. Chapter II is a survey of the literature 
8 
covering the econqmics of sport, cartel theory, and the 
economics of crime. Chapter III introduces a theoretical 
and empirical model of crime in sports administration. 
Chapter IV outlines empirical tests and the econometric 
results from an applied form of the model. Finally, Chapter 





This dissertation investigates the impact of market 
structure on NCAA violations. The basic methodology of this 
research represents the convergence of three branches of the 
economics paradigm. The relevant areas of the literature 
are: (1) the economics of sport; (2) the economics of crime; 
and (3) cartel theory. This literature review begins with a 
survey of the pertinent literature from the economics of 
sport before turning to the other two literatures. 
The Economics of Sport 
The economics of sport literature can be usefully 
organized into three different areas: sports-input market 
analysis, sports-output market analysis, and studies of NCAA 
practices. The analysis of sports-input markets centers on 
the marginal revenue products of athletes, economic rents, 
and vertical integration. The literature that analyzes the 
sports-output market centers on the exemption of sports 
entertainment organizations (including the NCAA) from 
antitrust legislation and the effects of vertical 
integration on output markets. Finally, the activities and 
practices of the NCAA as a sports organization have been 
evaluated from an economic perspective. 
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Sports-Input Market Analyses. 
James V. Koch has defined the input market in an 
athletic environment quite clearly in "The Economics of 
"Big-Time" Intercollegiate Athletics'' [Koch (1971)]. Koch 
recognizes, as others do, the " ... NCAA has assumed great 
power and simultaneously exercises the legislative, 
executive and judicial functions necessary to the 
maintenance of an orderly, collusive intercollegiate 
athletic market. 118 According to Koch, the NCAA typifies 
cartel behavior in the following ways: 
1) sets input prices for student athletes, 2) 
regulates the duration and intensity of usage of 
these inputs and their mobility during their 
careers as collegiate athletes 3) regulates the 
type and particularly the quantity of output of 
games 4) seeks to pool and divide portions of the 
cartel's profits 5) makes information available to 
the cartel concerning transactions, market 
conditions, and business accounting techniques 6) 
polices behaviors of the members of the cartel 7) 
levies penalties against cartel members for 
infractions9 
Koch further describes the positions of the market 
participants. The college or university is a firm; games 
played between it and rival teams comprise output. The 
products are differentiated and the university is a 
multiproduct firm. The inputs used are partial monopoly 
8 Koch, James V. "The Economics of "Big-Time" 
Intercollegiate Athletics" Social Science Quarterly 1971 p. 
240. 
9 'b'd 1 1 I P• 249. 
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owners of talent who sell to partial monopsonists. 
Accordingly, it is the availability of alternatives to non-
athletic activities that creates the source of negotiating 
power for the student-athletes. It is this power which 
enables him to earn a positive rent. 1° Koch suggests that 
more complete contracting between the NCAA and professional 
leagues might dissolve some of the power of the monopolistic 
sellers in the NCAA. 
In a related work by Hall and Lindsay {1980), the input 
market for American Medical Association medical schools is 
analogous to that of collegiate athletics. Contrary to the 
notion that the AMA exists primarily to restrict entry and 
retain rents, Hall and Lindsay show medical school 
admissions respond to market factors. They argue that 
excess demand in the input market is not necessarily a sign 
of collusion. Hall and Lindsay suggest the excess demand 
for admissions could simply be indicative of a market 
failing to clear. The authors examine the NFL to support 
their hypothesis. Each year, the NFL faces a potential 
player pool much larger than the number of players it 
employs. It does not expand, however, to accommodate the 
potential players; nor does it reduce salaries until the 
number of people willing to play in the league has fallen to 
the current number employed. Thus, the authors liken the 
10 'b'd 1 1 f P• 255. 
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medical schools' admissions policies to the NFL teams' 
search for the best quarterback: the best candidate 
(surgeon or quarterback) probably is not the cheapest. 
Therefore, excess demand in an input market does not 
necessarily imply the market is nonclearing. Since excess 
demand for student-athletes is created by the NCAA 
restrictions, the Hall and Lindsay reasoning may apply. 
A second interesting feature of this paper is its 
description of medical schools as suppliers of trained 
physicians who face negatively priced inputs (students). 
The demanders of the output of medical education are donors. 
Following Hall and Lindsay, the NCAA can be thought of as a 
supplier of trained athletes for the professional leagues. 
These athletes are not negatively priced; but, they are 
definitely obtained at below-market prices. This connection 
will be explored later. 
Sports-Output Market Analyses. 
The exemption of professional sports (and the NCAA) 
from antitrust regulation is another area of inquiry in the 
economics of sport. The NCAA claims, like the NFL, that 
extenuating circumstances differentiate it from commerce 
typically addressed by antitrust. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) 
examine this differentiation and find it to be lacking 
sufficient merit to warrant exemption. Within the context 
of their model, the authors find that sports teams are 
13 
protected from litigation because, they claim, playing 
strengths would not be equal otherwise. The authors show, 
in spite of this, protection from antitrust litigation does 
not result in equalization of playing strengths. Thus, 
there must be some other motive behind the league's advocacy 
of such an exemption. 
El-Hodiri and Quirk point out that Congressional 
activity with respect to sports has been confusing. 
Baseball has long been exempt from antitrust statues [see 
Baltimore Federal Baseball Club v. National League 1922, 
Toolson v. New York Yankees 1953). Yet, in Radovitch v. 
National Football League 1957, the courts held that 
professional football was not exempt. Since that time, 
Congress has been trying to reconcile the two disparate 
treatment of Major League Baseball and the National Football 
League. Needless to say, organized baseball has an 
incentive to devote resources to block any Congressional 
action to resolve the conflict. 
In any other form of commerce, rules governing the 
ownership and acquisition of inputs, territorial rights, and 
television and radio contracts would constitute illegal 
restraints of trade. Yet, in professional and amateur 
athletics, such rules persist. 11 El-Hodiri and Quirk model 
11The obvious exception is the decision in NCAA v. Board 
of Regents Of University of Oklahoma, et al (1984) in which 
the courts held that NCAA could not restrict teams' 
television contracts. 
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an n-team professional sports league reflecting some of 
these practices, where the teams are assumed to be profit 
maximizers. An essential ingredient in this model is that 
each team has an incentive to avoid becoming "too" superior. 
A league with an excessively dominant team will see gate 
receipts decline. At the same time, gate receipts for home 
teams increase when the home team has an increased 
probability of winning. Strategic behavior is suggested 
since each team's revenues depend in part on what other 
teams do. Of the several propositions established by El-
Hodiri and Quirk, the most important is the idea that 
equalization of playing strengths and profit maximization 
are consistent only under a limited set of circumstances. 
Myron C. Grauer offers yet another perspective on 
sports organizations. From a thorough investigation of 
consumer welfare maximization and the purpose of antitrust 
rules, Grauer suggests that the NFL (and, by implication, 
other sports organizations) should be considered a single 
entity for purposes. of antitrust. 12 From a consumer welfare 
maximization perspective, the NFL is likened to a law 
partnership. The teams actually are a joint venture that 
produce one product: football entertainment. Individually, 
these teams could not produce what they do jointly. As 
12 Grauer's analysis is motivated primarily by Los 
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL 1982 and North 
American Soccer League v. NFL 1982. 
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such, it is not capable of intraleague conspiracy and should 
not be pursued under section I of the Sherman Act. (A 
conspiracy cannot exist under section I of the Sherman Act 
among the individuals or divisions of one business entity. 
[See, e.g. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke 
& Liquors (1969), Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 
Inc.(1952), San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey 
League (1974)]. Grauer is careful to point out, however, 
the NFL or other sports leagues should not be exempt from 
the antitrust laws nor immune from section I liability. If 
practices of the NFL (perceived as a single entity) are not 
aimed at restricting output then the practices must be 
accepted as attempts to promote efficiency. Judicial 
interference could therefore produce anticompetitive effects 
since the NFL has to compete with other forms of 
entertainment for television revenues. 
Grauer further argues, as do El-Hodiri and Quirk, that 
the financial well-being of each team depends on the success 
of all the teams in the league. The success of a few teams 
does not invalidate the position that they should be treated 
as one entity under the antitrust laws. Further, the 
internal restraints and agreements made by the league are 
designed to promote efficiencies in competition for 
entertainment dollars and these practices should not be 
challenged. Various player-restraint cases are examined by 
Grauer and he concludes that the teams acted rationally and 
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not inappropriately in their efforts to compete with other 
entertainment forms. He reasons that a monopoly can 
sometimes be lawful; therefore, if it is lawful, there 
should be no jurisdiction over its buying habits. If, for 
example, the NFL can achieve some economies through the use 
of a draft, then it should not be challenged. Grauer 
suggests that football players should be treated as 
providers of goods and services to legal monopolies and 
should not complain if they dislike the terms offered by the 
monopolies. Rather, players should use collective 
bargaining to resolve any differences over contract terms 
instead of the courts. Based on these and other discussions, 
Grauer offers an alternative view of professional league 
behavior (and possibly NCAA behavior). 
The NCAA and Its Practices. 
studies of NCAA practices provides insight into market 
structure and performance. Recently, Fleisher, Goff, and 
Tollison (1992) collaborated on The National Collegiate 
Athletic Association: A study in Cartel Behavior, a 
contemporary discussion of the NCAA which includes several 
empirical studies. According to Fleisher et al., the NCAA 
exhibits explicit behavior which qualifies it as a cartel. 
Indicators of cartel behavior include: 
O the presence (at one time) of an exclusive 
television contract for football events 
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o increased revenues to coaches and schools 
with student-athlete compensation remaining 
fairly constant 
o exclusion of school brand-name and other 
capital assets from NCAA regulations 
o inconsistent regulation of other inputs used 
by schools 
o illicit payments 
o the marginal revenue product of student-
athletes being in excess of the value of the 
educational product received 
Several conditions are necessary to succeed in the pursuit 
of higher cartel profits. The cartel must have an effective 
enforcement and punishment system, limitations on 
alternative means of competing for inputs, and a fairly 
inelastic supply of inputs. The NCAA has managed to fulfill 
many of these conditions. The Committee on Infractions is 
able is issue the "death penalty" for repeated rules 
violations. The strict recruiting rules and standards 
governing academic performance effectively limit 
competition. Finally, it seems the supply of student-
athletes is relatively inelastic. Over time, increased 
demand for the NCAA product has resulted in increased rents 
available to firms within the cartel. 
Fleisher, et al., go on to show that the NCAA is not 
completely immune from the vagaries of the market however. 
18 
Changes in supply, the threat of competition from fringe 
firms, cheating, and other changing market conditions 
threaten cartel profitability. Indeed, intracartel 
competition is fierce in areas not covered by the rules (for 
example, physical capital). Such internal dissention could 
possibly weaken the NCAA. It can be shown that those who 
manage to acquire larger facilities, better players, and 
better brand-name capital tend to exercise authority within 
the cartel. 
In addition to the overview of cartel behavior, 
Fleisher, et al., have compiled several empirical studies of 
the NCAA and its practices. The first of these empirical 
studies uses logit analysis to predict enforcement using 
winning variability, direct monitoring costs, amount of 
cheating, and other probability terms as explanatory 
variables. Data from Division IA schools over the 1953-1983 
period were used. The primary result of this analysis is 
that consistent winners are not punished as often as 
variable winners. The authors suggest the cartel uses 
probabilistic evidence to infer cheating. A secondary 
result of the research is that crime pays. Those schools 
put on probation experienced an increased mean winning 
percentage of roughly 26 per cent (Fleisher, et al., 1992). 
The next study tests whether the NCAA votes to restrict 
entry by imposing academic standards. Specifically, support 
or opposition of restricted entry is a function of academic 
19 
quality, demand for athletics, cartel rule breaking and 
independent affiliation. Using the actual vote on the 1986 
SAT/grade point average trade-off proposal as the dependent 
variable, it was discovered that members do vote to restrict 
entry. 
Finally, Fleisher, et al., test a capture hypothesis. 
Cartel members can capture control of the regulatory process 
by securing key committee memberships and voting privileges. 
The cartel members demand regulation from the NCAA to 
protect the positive economic rents they earn from 
restricted competition. Therefore, controlling the supply 
of regulation is beneficial to cartel members. The capture 
hypothesis of Fleisher, et al., suggests membership on the 
enforcement committee will, ceteris paribus, be a positive 
function of the school's mean winning percentage in 
football. Overall, tests of this hypothesis result in its 
acceptance. 
Another interesting aspect of NCAA behavior concerns 
enforcement. Fleisher, Goff, Shughart, and Tollison {1987) 
investigate enforcement techniques of the NCAA football 
cartel. The so-called "sanity rule" of 1948 governed 
recruitment and financial aid guidelines. This rule 
eventually gave birth to an environment rampant with 
strategic behavior and rules violations. Despite this 
flagrant cartel behavior, the Supreme Court upheld some of 
the restrictions on competition in the interest of 
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preserving competitive balance. The authors attempt to 
model the enforcement of NCAA rules. How, for example, is 
cheating detected? While the focus of the paper is not on 
market structure, the observations on enforcement techniques 
yield useful insights into the supply of offenses theory. 
Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that student 
athletes are not paid the marginal revenue product {MRP) 
their labor generates. As a result, the university captures 
an economic rent. 
cartel Theory 
The NCAA exhibits so many "classic" cartel 
characteristics, it is, literally, a "textbook" case. 
Browning and Browning {1989) use the NCAA as an example of a 
buying cartel in their intermediate microeconomic theory 
text. The Brownings point out that the NCAA acquired 
monopsony power as strict recruiting rules were instituted 
between 1950 and 1970. Limited off-campus visits, ope paid 
student-visit, a national letter-of-intent, and caps on the 
number and size of scholarships awarded are some of these 
restrictive rules. According to Browning and Browning, 
these, and other similar rules, are examples of collusive 
tactics. The letter-of-intent, for example, is a form of 
signaling. Once a team has succeeded in "wooing" a player, 
the letter is a signal to other teams the student-athlete is 
"taken". In other words, the letter says "Don't waste any 
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more resources on this input." Alternatively, the letter of 
intent can be viewed as a contract between schools and 
student-athletes. Since the student-athlete must sit out 
one year if he or she transfers to another NCAA school, the 
letter of intent effectively reduces student-athlete 
mobility and, therefore, reduces competition. Other rules 
reduce entry and raise the cost of cheating. The recruiting 
restrictions prevent dissipation of cartel rents to players 
and families that would otherwise earn them if competition 
for student-athletes prevailed. 
This overall strategy is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 1. In a perfectly competitive market for S/A labor, 
w1 would be the equilibrium wage (determined by the 
intersection of the market demand and supply curves at point 
a). At this competitive wage, the firm would imply 11 units 
of labor. However, since NCAA rules effectively reduce 
employment, the wage rate is reduced tow' if the market 
supply curve is upward sloping. When the market supply 
curve is positively sloped, the marginal factor cost (MFC) 
is positively sloped. Thus, the profit-maximizing level of 
employment occurs where MFC just equals the marginal revenue 
product (MRP) of labor, or at point c in figure 1. This 
means the cartel will choose to employ L2 units of labor and 
will pay w'--an amount less than the MFC. The NCAA 
sanctioned wage, w', becomes the only legal payment the 
school can use to employ student-athletes. Therefore, w' is 
22 
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Figure 1 Due to the presence of monopsony power, the 
school uses 12 uni ts of labor and earns economic rent 
equivalent to the distance cd in the Market diagram. 
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the perfectly elastic wage the school faces. The school 
will then use 12 units of labor and will earn a per unit 
rent which is equivalent to the distance cd in the market 
diagram. Every team is inclined to reduce its use of 
athletes to the point where the marginal cost equals the 
marginal benefit (12). By restricting output, the cartel 
creates rents equivalent to the distance OL2 multiplied by 
the distance ed. These rents are captured by member 
schools. 13 
As illustrated, this strategy results in lower 
production costs and increased cartel profit so long as 
members do not cheat. Despite the numerous incidents of 
cheating over the years, the NCAA still manages to retain 
significant economic rents. 14 In 1983, television revenues 
alone were more than $64 million. In fact, the NCAA once 
had a four-year contract with ABC and CBS to telecast 
college football games for a total fee of $263 million (the 
Supreme Court later voided the contract). Since the NCAA is 
a non-profit organization, rents are not extracted directly. 
Instead, they are extracted indirectly in the form of higher 
salaries and other perks like larger expense accounts, 
13The graphs are adapted from Browning and Browning 
Microeconomic Theory and Applications, Fourth Edition, 1992 
p. 577. 
14The terms "profit" and "rent" can be used 
interchangeably. Revenues minus costs (including 
opportunity costs) equal rents. 
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better equipment, and extended travel. As reported in 
Fleisher, et al., the average base pay for football coaches 
(in Division I schools} in 1986 was $106,458. This average 
does not include in-kind and outside compensation. 15 
Advertising contracts, housing, insurance and other outside 
compensation can increase a coach's total earnings by 
several hundred thousand dollars. In addition, cartel rents 
are evidenced by the emergence of new and improved 
facilities, administrative and assistant staffs, and a new 
NCAA complex in Kansas. With over one thousand member 
schools, the potential economic rents available to the 
various athletic programs are substantial. 16 Financially, 
the incentives for program administrators to cheat are 
obvious. 
Since cheating is a problem common to all cartels, 
there are very few examples of cartels that have been 
consistently successful. According to D.K. Osborne, this is 
true because cartels face one external and four internal 
problems. The external problem is to predict and discourage 
production by nonmember firms. The internal problems are 
really the constraints the cartel faces when it tries to 
optimize its production: selecting the optimal amount of 
u See Fleisher, et al. (1992), p. 85. 
16 Fleisher, et al. (1992} contains numerous data from 
other sources concerning television revenues, coaching 
salaries, etc. See, especially, pages 53, 76, and 85. 
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output, divide output between member firms, detect cheating, 
and deter cheating [Osborne p. 835 (1976)]. Given these 
problems, economic theory suggests cartels will be 
inherently unstable. Osborne argues, however, that a cartel 
is unstable only if it faces "inherently insoluble 
problems" [Osborne p. 843 (1976)]. He supports this 
argument with a mathematical model which implies a quota 
rule such that none of the problems mentioned is 
theoretically insoluble. This is not to say cartels will 
always be stable. Osborne merely explains that stability 
will depend on the circumstances surrounding the cartel. 
For example, is the cartel threatened by the emergence of 
new substitutes? Is the power of the cartel offset by the 
presence of a buying agency or coalition (as in the case of 
some raw material producers)? Factors such as these affect 
stability. Thus, generalized predictions about durability 
are not justified. 
With the incentives to cheat firmly established, what 
can the cartel do to detect and/or monitor cheating? 
According to Carlton and Perloff (1990), four factors aid in 
the detection of cheating in a cartel. They are: 
1) a small number of firms, 
2) prices that do not fluctuate independently, 
3) prices that are widely known, and 
4) members that sell identical products at the 
same point in the distribution chain. 
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While the first factor might be subject to debate vis-a-vis 
the NCAA (does 1000+ member "firms" qualify as small?), the 
latter three factors certainly apply. NCAA "prices" are 
established by well-documented and widely known rules. All 
member firms produce roughly identical output within the 
same point in the distribution chain. Theoretically, 
cheating should be relatively easy to detect within the 
NCAA. The problems of detection will be discussed later. 
While detecting cheating is certainly important to the 
effective operation of a cartel, its success also depends on 
barriers to entry. Again, Carlton and Perloff suggest that 
"Only cartels that do not fall apart through lack of 
cooperation and exist where entry is difficult can maintain 
market power" (Carlton and Perloff p. 209). Fleisher, Goff, 
and Tollison (1992) point out that the NCAA is subject to 
lumpy entry conditions. In order to compete with the 
cartel, an alternative association must be formed. Sports 
competition cannot be produced by one firm; it takes a 
minimum of two! 17 Therefore, a first mover problem exists in 
this market. The first school to break away from the cartel 
must incur substantial start-up costs to form another 
league. Therefore, the incentive to leave is diminished. 
For this reason, entry is lumpy; the initial start-up costs 
17 Under certain circumstances, even two teams are not 
enough. See, for example, the Dream Team performances in 
Barcelona in 1992. 
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for potential competitors are very high. 
Barriers to entry can also be measured by capital 
intensity (Carlton and Perloff p. 370). Examining the 
capital intensity of Division I schools alone hints that 
barriers to entry are significant if measured this way. 
Stadiums, training facilities, and other related apparatus 
are steadily growing in size and cost. This capital 
intensity deters smaller potential entrants. Another 
barrier to entry exists in the NCAA rules themselves. 
Division IA status requires, inter alia, an average 4-year 
home attendance of at least 17,000, a stadium seating-
capacity of 30,000 (or be a member of a conference where at 
least six schools sponsor football and one-half meet the 
attendance requirement), and a specific minimum number of 
men's and women's sports. Capital intensity, lumpiness of 
entry, and NCAA rules imply fairly difficult entry 
conditions for this market. 
The structural differences between colluders and 
noncolluders have been further examined by Peter Asch and 
J.J. Seneca [Asch and Seneca (1976)]. Their results are 
important because they spring from one of only a few 
empirical studies of cartel behavior. 18 According to Asch 
and Seneca, this scarcity is due to two factors. The first 
is the theoretical and definitional ambiguity surrounding 
18 Other empirical studies include Erickson (1969), Fog 
(1956), Palmer (1972), and Phillips (1972). 
28 
collusive behavior. Sometimes cartels are treated as a 
special case of monopoly; sometimes game theory and/or 
strategic behavior types of models are used to illustrate 
cartel decision making. In addition, some economists (like 
Machlup and Bain) view most all oligopoly behavior as 
collusive. This makes empirical investigation difficult. 
As Asch and Seneca point out: 
Any study of collusion must ... confront not only 
somewhat uncertain performance expectations, but 
also the direct dependence of these expectations 
upon the definition of collusion that is adopted 
[Asch and Seneca p.2]. 
Despite this difficulty, Asch and Seneca manage to 
estimate a model which predicts profitability based on 
structural and other variables. These variables include: 
length of collusion, advertising sales, compound growth, 
number of colluders, entry barriers, firm size, risk, and 
industry concentration. They report, however, that their 
interpretation of causality is not definite. They suggest 
three possible scenarios. First, collusion may lead 
consistently to lower profits. Second, poor profit 
performance may induce firms to collude. Third, poor 
collusive performance is simply the most likely to be 
discovered since antitrust law enforcement is often biased. 
Economics of Crime 
Aside from the obvious financial rewards, why do 
schools cheat on NCAA rules? In a broader context, what 
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causes cartel members to cheat on an agreement? Following 
Becker (1968), a number of studies have attempted to explain 
criminal behavior with economic theory. While some may 
object to calling violators of NCAA rules "criminals", the 
decision making of the potential felon is similar to the 
potential violator of NCAA rules. The details of these 
studies will be examined below. The basic approach, though, 
is one of optimization. The gains from cheating must 
outweigh the costs if one is to act illegally. Using this 
kind of analysis, a supply of offenses function can be 
formed. 
The arguments of such a "cheating function" include the 
marginal cost of cheating, the probability of arrest and 
conviction, and the marginal benefit of cheating. Turning 
to the specific case of cheating in the NCAA, the supply of 
offenses should also be a function of the relative monopsony 
power of the sport and vertical integration. Again, this 
relationship between differential monopsony power and 
cheating forms the basis of this dissertation. 
Gary s. Becker and William M. Landes have compiled 
several studies in their Essays in the Economics of Crime 
and Punishment (1974). In the preface to these essays, the 
authors make the point that the key to economic analysis of 
enforcement (in criminal behavior) is the application of the 
principle of scarcity. Those that choose to break laws are 
viewed as rational economic agents who weigh the costs and 
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benefits of both legal and illegal behavior. They own their 
own labor (which is scarce) and must decide how to best 
allocate it to maximize their utility. In this respect, 
many of the models developed in this area are similar to the 
standard labor supply model. The supply of criminal 
offenses can be fashioned after a portfolio approach or as a 
time allocation problem. 19 The time allocation approach is 
superior in that it allows non-monetary benefits and costs 
to enter the utility maximization problem. 
The seminal piece on the economics of crime is 
attributed to Gary Becker (Becker (1968)). He approaches 
the supply of offenses with a time allocation scheme such 
that criminal acts will be c.ommitted if the benefits exceed 
the costs of the next-best alternative activity. The supply 
of offenses is determined by the probability of conviction 
per offense, the punishment per offense, and a "portmanteau" 
variable capturing omitted effects. The supply of offenses 
is inversely related to both the probability of conviction 
and punishment. 
Ehrlich (1973) derives a supply of offenses function 
via a one-period uncertainty model. His model includes a 
behavioral function relating participation in illegal 
activity to the following variables: the wages from legal 
19 Heineke, J.M. "Economic Models of Criminal Behavior: 
An overview" in Economic Models of Criminal Behavior, J.M. 
Heineke, editor, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1978, pp 3-
10. 
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activity; the wages from illegal activity; a discount factor 
for illegal wages if apprehended; the subjective probability 
of apprehension; and the probability of unemployment from 
legal activities. This behavioral model is operationalized 
through an econometric specification where the mean, or 
group, supply of offenses function is estimated. The 
difference in Ehrlich's approach is his use of both costs 
and gains from criminal behavior. His results indicate that 
crime and legal activities are not mutually exclusive--there 
is an optimal activity mix. 
Block and Reineke (1975) are critical of the Becker and 
Ehrlich approaches. They argue the decision to engage in 
illegal activity is really a multiattribute choice problem. 
Accordingly, Becker and Ehrlich have misspecified their 
particular models. This misspecification vitiates their 
conclusions, or at least reduces their validity to a smaller 
subset of circumstances. When the supply of offenses is 
derived, Block and Reineke show that changes in wealth, 
payoffs to illegal activity, enforcement, punishment, and 
the degree of certainty of punishment " ... have no 
qualitative supply implications under traditional preference 
restrictions. 1120 
Another approach is the economics of enforcement as 
20 Block, M. K. and J.M. Reineke " A Labor Theoretic 
Analysis of the Criminal Choice" American Economic Review, 
June 1975, p. 314. 
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developed by Stigler (1970). The marginal cost and 
deterrence are important factors in determining optimum 
enforcement of laws. Stigler views the supply of offenses 
function as both a production and a consumption function 
(i.e., theft, smuggling, violating regulations are acts of 
production while speeding is an act of consumption, etc.). 
The professional criminal seeks income and chooses an 
occupation based on the standard labor supply model. 
Stigler suggests that, in equilibrium, the supply of 
offenses has the following properties: 1) net returns are 
equalized and adjusted for risk and costs 2) determinants of 
the supply function are subject to control by society 3) 
penalties and chances of detection and punishment are 
increasing functions of the enormity of the offense. 
In a related empirical work, McCormick and Tollison 
show that "crime" on the basketball court is elastic with 
respect to enforcement (McCormick and Tollison (1984)]. 
This paper studies the effect of increased law enforcement 
on the arrest rate. Specifically, data on the number of 
fouls called at basketball games when there are two referees 
and the number of fouls called when there are three referees 
are examined. The effect of increased "police" is 
ambiguous; arrests can go up or down. However, an 
increased probability of arrest results in fewer criminal 
acts. One of the most interesting observations from this 
research is the demand for crime derives from the free-lunch 
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theorem--not all crime is worth preventing. In other words, 
there is an optimal mix of crime and obedience. 21 
McCormick and Tollison test hypotheses with 
simultaneous models of enforcers and criminals. Data on 
fouls per game from the complete history of the Atlantic 
Coast Conference 1954-1983 were used. Similar to other 
models, the probability that a criminal commits a crime is a 
function of the expected costs and benefits of crime. The 
expected costs of crime is the probability of arrest and 
conviction times the fine of conviction; the expected 
benefit of crime is the probability of not being detected 
times the rewards of illegal behavior. The model allows 
for an arrest whether or not a crime is committed. A sign 
for the coefficient of the probability of an arrest (with 
respect to the number of policeman) is shown to be 
ambiguous. The authors thus try to establish a sign 
empirically. To estimate the sign, data from the Atlantic 
Coast Conference were analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares 
regression analysis. Tests showed that the number of 
referees had a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the number of fouls. In fact, the effect of hiring the 
third official was a reduction in arrests (fouls) by 34 
percent. 
Of the vast literature on crime and subset of that 
n As mentioned earlier, Ehrlich (1973) also suggests an 
optimal mix of crime. 
34 
literature dealing with economic analysis of criminal 
behavior, the supply of offenses function can be defined and 
tested. Yet, to date, use of the supply of offenses 
function in the study of cartel theory is noticeably absent. 
This dissertation will unite the economics of crime and 
cartel theory via the economics of sport. In particular, 
the simultaneous nature of the markets for violations and 
athletes will be established. Utilizing contributions from 
cartel theory, the economics of sport, and the economics of 
crime, a model of crime in sports administration will be 
developed. The "criminals" in this model may or may not be 
actual administrators of athletic programs. Rather, the 
term "sports administration" is used in a general sense; 
many individuals may have power to act on behalf of a 
school's athletic program (i.e., the director, coaches, 
presidents, alumni). By interpreting the term broadly, any 




A THEORETICAL MODEL OF CRIME 
IN SPORTS ADMINISTRATION 
A cartel must inevitably deal with cheating. In the 
NCAA's case, the Committee on Infractions is responsible for 
dealing with schools who cheat. Based on the argument 
outlined in Chapter I, the relative monopsony power between 
sports may help to explain and/or predict NCAA violations. 
The investigation of this relationship requires the 
construction of a model which will examine crime in sports 
administration. The theoretical foundations of the model 
will be explored first. Following the theoretical 
development, the interrelationships between the input market 
and the violations market will be established. Finally, the 
determinants of the violations market will be discussed. In 
chapter IV, an applied form of the model will be presented. 
The Athletic Department as a Firm 
Standard neoclassical theory models the firm as a 
profit maximizer. This approach implies behavior which 
maximizes revenues and minimizes costs. The firm selects 
the level of output which maximizes its profits and employs 
resources so as to produce the optimum output at least cost. 
Although the NCAA is a non-profit organization, the 
neoclassical model can still be applied for the following 
reasons. NCAA member schools earn economic rents, as 
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discussed above, from exploitation of the input market. 
These rents are simply the cartel profits and, since the 
schools are non-profit, will be dissipated in the form of 
higher salaries, enhanced facilities, in-kind payments, and 
other expenses. Thus, the neoclassical model can be adapted 
to view NCAA members as seeking to maximize economic 
rents (ffi) • 22 
Rents are maximized from the production of revenue 
producing sports entertainment. Like any production 
process, the manufacture of this output generates revenues 
(R) and costs (C) are incurred. Sports entertainment 
revenues come in the form of gate receipts, concessions, 
donations, merchandising, and broadcasting fees (both TV and 
radio). For the purposes of this study, these revenues will 
depend on (1) the school's NCAA division status and other 
athletic affiliations (A), (2) the school's winning 
percentages (P) in each of the sports and (3) the NCAA's 
market power (MKT) in each of the sports. Thus, revenues 
nlt should be noted, however, that the behavior of the 
athletic departments with respect to the NCAA could also be 
modeled within a principal-agent framework. Once membership 
criteria are met, departments may seek to maximize their own 
revenue by violating NCAA rules. In this manner the schools 
benefit from their association with the NCAA while at the 
same time take actions which undermine the cartel's very 
existence. This agency theory approach might lend 
additional insight into certain aspects of departmental 
behavior, yet the neoclassical view allows for the 
straightforward development of supply and demand 
relationships. For this reason, a neoclassical approach is 
utilized. 
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can be written as a function: 
R = R(A,p ,MKT), [1] 
where oR/oA>O; oR/op >O; aR/aMKT>O. The partial derivatives 
with respect to each variable are positive. This implies 
that each variable is directly related to revenues. For 
example, revenues increase as schools upgrade their NCAA 
divisional status (Division IA being the highest).n In 
higher divisions there is more television exposure, gate 
receipts are higher (from increased capacity requirements), 
and concessions generally increase with attendance. 
Revenues also increase with the success of the teams in 
athletic competition. Casual observation indicates that 
attendance and television exposure are both directly related 
to a team's success. For example, with respect to football, 
most of the schools with the highest average attendance 
(Michigan, Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, and Auburn) 
also have substantial television revenues (over $12.4 
million in 1989). These same schools have historical 
winning percentages above 60% and have all consistently 
finished their seasons in the top 20.~ Finally, revenues 
23 The following example illustrates the relationship 
between affiliation and revenue. The University of Tulsa 
falsified records in men's track in order to meet the 
requirements for NCAA Di vision IA status (i.e.', 7 sport 
requirement). As a result, the university met CFA 
membership requirements and subsequently received a share of 
the CFA rent distribution totalling $250,000. 
~ See Fleisher, et al, pp. 77-78. 
38 
increase with increased market power. As monopsony power 
increases, student-athletes have fewer employment 
alternatives. Thus, the schools enjoy increased revenues 
from the rents earned on the exploited student-athletes. 
The costs of producing sports entertainment include 
payments for inputs (I), such as, labor, capital, supplies, 
transportation, and (in the spirit of the Byers quote cited 
previously) NCAA sanctions. These expenses will also be 
related to the schools' athletic affiliations (A). 
Therefore, the cost function can be expressed as: 
C = C(A,I), [2] 
where oC/oA>O; and oC/oI>O. The partial derivatives with 
respect to affiliation and inputs are both positive 
indicating direct relationships between affiliation and cost 
and "inputs" and cost. Cost will be positively related to 
the school's athletic affiliations. For example, Division 
IA status requires schools to sponsor a minimum of seven 
men's and seven women's sports. Moreover, costs are 
directly related to the price paid for inputs. Increases in 
the prices of equipment, facilities, coaches, and student-
athletes will increase the costs of producing sports 
entertainment. 
It should be noted that cost is being used in the 
strict economic sense, the value of the resource's next best 
alternative. It is important to distinguish between the 
economic costs (C) of running an athletic department and the 
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actual costs (Cil). The actual costs will include the 
dissipated economic rents. 25 In other words, the actual 
costs could be greater than or equal to the economic costs 
depending on the value of the economic rents earned. If the 
department hires several exceptional quality athletes (such 
that there is a sizeable gap between the wage paid for their 
services and the MRP each athlete contributes) then the 
economic rents earned may be used to augment the actual 
costs of running the athletic program. Conversely, if 
recruiting efforts do not yield any superior athletes, 
economic rents earned would be zero and actual costs would 
equal economic costs. 
Formally, the schools' objectives are to maximize the 
economic rents of producing sports entertainment. The 
objective function thus becomes: 
91 = R(A,.¢7,MKT) - C(A,I) 26 [3] 
Since revenues and costs are both functions of athletic 
affiliation, the economic rents will likewise be a function 
of this variable plus, winning percentage, market power and 
the price of inputs, or 
~Formally, we can define the economic rents as the 
difference between actual expenses and economic cost, or 
9?=Cil-C. 
26This function will have a maximum if we assume that 
(1) the second partial derivative of the revenue function is 
negative (i.e., diminishing marginal benefits of winning) 
and (2) the second derivative of the cost function is 
positive (i.e., rising marginal costs of producing winning 
teams). 
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ffl = ffl(A,p,MKT,I). [4] 
This study will hold athletic affiliations constant by 
examining violations committed by NCAA division IA schools 
only. Likewise, the relative market power experienced by 
each sport is assumed constant (as determined by the 
existing professional sports organizations) .v In addition, 
the markets for all inputs except student-athlete labor are 
assumed competitive with the resulting prices fixed. 
Assuming away these aspects of the college sports 
entertainment market reduces economic rents to a function of 
the success rate of the school's teams, or 
m = fflCP). (5] 
This study is, in effect, positing the adage: "winning isn't 
everything, it's the only thing". 
The Theory of Production and Athletic Competition 
The problem facing NCAA member-schools is to find the 
optimum winning percent. Sports fans, the consumers of 
sports production, demand competition. If a team wins "too 
much", the outcome of any game becomes predictable and 
competition is diminished. Therefore, the objective for 
schools is one of optimization versus maximization of 
winning percentages. This process can be interpreted using 
v That is, for any given year, the organization of the 
professional leagues is assumed fixed. Over time, the 
market power of the leagues may change. 
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the standard neoclassical theory of production where output 
is related to input usage. The ratio of wins to games 
played is the athletic department's output. This output is 
produced using multiple inputs. While most production 
processes use a combination of human and non-human 
resources, game rules eliminate (for the most part) the 
direct role that non~human resources play in determining the 
outcome of athletic contests. The primary determinants of a 
school's won-loss record will be the labor of (1) student-
athletes (L~A), and (2) coaches and other labor inputs 
(Lother) • The relationship between output and inputs is 
summarized using traditional production notation: 
rP = rP (Ls/AstLother)• 
The standard theory of production leads us to expect the 
following partial derivatives: 
O(p / OLs/As > 0, 02{P / 0 (Ls/As) 2 < 0 
op /0L0 t11er > O, o2{P /o(L0 t11er) 2 < O, or 
the marginal product of each input is positive but 
decreasing. 
(6) 
The interpretation of the human resources devoted to 
the production of athletic success differs from the usual 
treatment. Since the size of a team is fixed, it is the 
quality of the labor that is varied rather than the 
quantity. Athletic departments increase their winning 
percentages by hiring better coaching staffs, more effective 
administrators and recruiting more talented athletes. It is 
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here, in the recruitment, enrollment, and maintenance of 
athletic eligibility of student athletes that crime in 
sports administration occurs. 
The Input and Violations Markets 
The demand for inputs is derived from the production 
function. The production of sports entertainment (and 
winning percentages) requires student-athletes, other labor 
inputs, and the facilities and equipment associated with 
athletic competition. The standard approach witnesses 
thefirm making input decisions based on marginal benefits 
and marginal costs of employing the resource. With regard 
to student-athletes, schools will compare the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of student-athletes with the wage they 
must pay the student-athletes. Specifically, the MRP of the 
student-athlete is the increase in the won/loss record (the 
marginal product of the student-athlete, or Bp / BLs,As) 
multiplied by the increase in rents from the increase in the 
winning percentage (or BR/Bp ). Thus, 
MRPs/A = (BR/Bp ) (Bp /BLs/As) [7] 
In the absence of NCAA restrictions, schools will hire 
student-athletes so long as the MRP exceeds or is equal to 
the wage. The higher the wage, the smaller is the quantity 
of high-quality student-athletes demanded and vice versa. 
This relationship is depicted in Figure 2 panel (a). It 
should be emphasized that the wage schools pay for student-
43 
athletes represents the legal payment as set forth in the 
NCAA Manual. NCAA rules reduce the payment to student-
athletes to w1 and the cartel captures rents equal to the 
shaded area in panel (a) in Figure 2. 
In the same way, the schools will hire other labor 
inputs (coaches, trainers, etc.) so long as the marginal 
revenue product of each of these inputs exceeds or is equal 
to their respective prices. If the markets for these other 
labor inputs are competitive, these resources are obtained 
through price competition and no exploitation occurs. 
since NCAA rules prohibit schools from using price 
competition to attract/recruit student-athletes, schools 
will resort to other means of competition. In addition to 
the NCAA~sanctioned recruiting tools and offers (campus 
visits, scholarships, facilities, etc.), schools may also 
) 
resort to non-sanctioned offers. Generically, the latter 
are recruiting violations. These unsanctioned offers then 
become part of the demand for student-athlete labor. 
Formally, the student-athlete demand function can be 
expressed as: 
DL = DL (GRANT, PoTHERr V, (fJ ) , [8] 
where GRANT is the NCAA sanctioned wage, PornER is the price 
of other inputs, ffJ is the school's winning percentage in the 
sport, and V are NCAA violations. 
This input demand function is analogous to the 
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Figure 2 The production of sports entertainment requires 
the use of S/A labor. The demand for this labor, DsM, 
gives rise to the production of violations, V8 • 
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theory of the firm. The demand is a function of input 
prices and the level of output. As a neoclassical input 
demand function, we can expect the demand for higher quality 
student-athlete labor to exhibit the usual characteristics. 
The demand will be an inverse function of the input's own 
price, i.e., aoL/dGRANT < o. That is, as the value of the 
legal payment to athletes increases, the gap between it and 
the MRP declines. Therefore, the potential rent declines as 
well. With less marginal rent available, the marginal 
benefit from using one more unit of high quality S/A labor 
diminishes. Thus, DL decreases as GRANT increases; there 
is an inverse relation between quality S/A labor demanded 
and price. Moreover, since violations are covert means of 
recruiting student-athletes, the demand will be inversely 
related to violations, or aoL;av < o. The violations 
committed add to the total price of quality S/A labor making 
it more expensive to obtain. It is useful to consider GRANT 
as the explicit cost of S/A labor and Vas the implicit 
cost. As the number of violations increases then, the units 
of high quality S/A labor demanded decreases. The cross-
price effects will be indeterminate, depending on whether 
the other inputs are substitutes (in which case dDLf dPornER 
will be positive) or complements (in which case aodaPOTHER 
will be negative). Finally, the demand for student-athlete 
labor will be an increasing function of the output (winning-
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percentages) SO that aDL/ap is positive.~ 
The input demand function descr'ibed above is 
simultaneously a production function for the school. Since 
NCAA rules fix the number of athletes teams may use, fierce 
competition for better quality athletes arises. Recruiting 
can then be viewed as a production process where schools, or 
agents acting on behalf of schools (representatives of 
athletic interests) supply violations and other inputs (such 
as facilities, past won/loss records and a basic 
scholarship) to recruit more talented athletes. Therefore, 
just as the production of sports entertainment creates a 
derived demand for quality student-athletes, the demand for 
student-athletes creates a willingness to supply, or produce 
violations. 29 This intuitive link will be examined further 
below. In the pursuit of better won/loss records and the 
higher rents athletic success produces, schools have an 
incentive to cheat on the NCAA sanctioned wage. By 
cheating, and offering star student-athletes cash or in-kind 
28This is equivalent to assuming that 
elasticity of student-athlete labor is positive, 
) (p /Ls1A) > 0. 
the output 
or ( aLs,AI ap 
~ It should be noted that this treatment of the supply 
and demand for violations is rooted in the economics of 
crime literature. A more typical approach might view the 
demand for cheating .as emanating from the firm (i.e., 
cheating is just another input the firm demands to produce 
its output). While this view is more traditional, the 
approach taken here reflects the influence of the criminal 
behavior models discussed in the economics of crime section 
of chapter II. 
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benefits that exceed the NCAA-defined legal maximum, the 
schools can obtain more talented athletes and increase their 
winning percentages and their economic rent. Thus, the 
demand for student-athletes translates into a supply of 
violations as illustrated in panel (b) in Figure 2. 
To more fully explain this reciprocal relationship 
between demand and supply, an adaptation of John Stuart 
Mill's reciprocal demand model (as interpreted graphically 
by Edgeworth and Marshall) is depicted in Figure 3. First, 
consider panel (a) in Figure 3. The vertical axis 
represents varying qualities of S/A labor (with poorer 
quality labor near the origin and higher quality away from 
the origin). The horizontal axis represents quantities of 
violations (V). The line OU indicates an athletic 
department's willingness, ceteris paribus, to exchange NCAA 
rules violations for star athletes. Other things equal, we 
can expect schools to commit more violations for more star 
athletes, i.e. OU will be upward sloping. Moveover, 
neoclassical theory would predict a declining marginal 
willingness to cheat since the marginal product of student-
athlete labor ( op / cJL81A) is subject to diminishing returns. 
This accounts for the increasing slope of OU. 
The line OP in Figure 3(b) indicates the terms of 
trade, i.e. the number of violations required to acquire a 
given quality of star athletes. The flatter this line, the 
more expensive student-athlete labor is in terms of 
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Figure 3 The offer curve, OU, illustrates the willingness 
of a school to offer violations to secure better quality 
S/As. The rays, OP, OP', OP"" reflect the terms of trade 
between quality and violations. 
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violations. As the slope of OP increases, more star-quality 
student-athlete labor can be acquired for any given number 
of violations. Take, for example, the amount of labor L0SJA· 
To acquire this amount of labor, a school must commit V, V', 
or V" violations as the terms of trade move from OP, to OP', 
to OP". 
The willingness-to-cheat curve, OU, can be used to 
derive a demand for student-athlete. labor. Additionally, a 
supply of violations curve can be derived from the same sets 
of curves. The school will select a combination of 
violations and student-athlete labor based on the terms of 
trade. The equilibrium combination, a la Mill/Marshall, 
will be at the intersection of OU and OP. Taking all 
alternative terms-of-trade (price) lines and finding the 
OP/OU intersections produces two sets of data: (1) a 
collection of price/labor quantity data, and (2) a 
collection of price/violations data. This information can 
be translated to the conventional format found in panels (a) 
and (b) in Figure 4. 
The relative (in terms of violations) price of quality 
student-athlete labor is on the vertical axis of panel (a) 
in Figure 4 while the quality of student-athlete labor is on 
the horizontal axis. The prices p, p', p" from Figure 3 
panel (b) are transferred to the vertical axis in Figure 
4(a). For each of these prices, the quality of labor 





>1 'O -Q 
<tS s 




0 tl.a tl.a 
::; 0 
'j,..j .......... .......... tl.a tl.a Oi n n .......... .......... ~ ·M n n 
0 ...i 11.l 
(I) Q ..:I 





'j,..j - ..:I ::, <tS 
O'l -·M ~ i:r.. 011.l 
..:I 
- 0 tl.a 
Figure 4 The demand for S/A labor results in the supply of 
violations. 
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curve, DL. Now, for each point on the curve DL, there is a 
corresponding number of violations produced to secure the 
desired quality of S/A labor. Figure 4(b) illustrates the 
supply of violations function generated from the demand for 
quality S/A labor. The demand function in panel (a) is 
equivalent to the supply of violations in Figure 4(b). 
The key to this simultaneous relationship is the effect 
the NCAA cartel has on the behavior of the school and its 
agents in the production of sports entertainment. Because 
of the NCAA cartel, the school acts as a monopsonist in the 
labor market; this behavior is captured in the demand for 
S/A labor. At the same time, the very existence of the 
cartel creates economic incentives for the schools to cheat 
on the sanctioned wage; this behavior is captured by the 
supply of violations. Thus, the production of sports 
entertainment results in participation in a labor market 
which is, at the same time, a violations market. 
Consequently, the behavior of the schools can be studied and 
described from either perspective. 
Focusing on the violations market, the supply of 
violations defines the general willingness of schools to 
break NCAA rules. The economics of crime literature 
indicates that the willingness to break rules (laws) will be 
influenced by the costs and benefits of cheating. As the 
benefits of higher winning percentages rise, the willingness 
to cheat will also increase. A higher marginal product of 
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student-athlete labor will also increase the willingness to 
break rules as will increased monopsony power. This latter 
influence reflects the higher marginal rents available from 
exploitation of student-athlete labor. Sports with greater 
monopsony power (i.e., football and basketball) have the 
potential to earn higher rents from cheating. The potential 
costs of cheating (forsaken television revenues, etc.) will 
deter violations as they increase. Following the economics 
of crime literature, what matters is the expected costs: the 
penalty multiplied by the probability of punishment. 
Given the influence of the crime literature, a supply 
of violations function can be presented formally as: 
vs= VsCPv, MKT, FINE, PROB) [ 9] 
where Vs is the quantity of violations supplied; Pv is the 
price of violations; FINE is the costs of cheating (the NCAA 
imposed sanctions); MKT is the degree of monopsony power; 
and PROB represents the probability of being caught and 
punished. From the preceding discussion, we would expect 
the following relations: 
dVsf dPv > QI 
dV8 / cJMKT > 0, 
cJV9 / cJFINE < 0, and 
dV8 / cJPROB < 0. 
The price of violations, Pv, represents the marginal rent 
the school gains from cheating (the distance between the 
demand curve and w1 in panel (a) of Figure 2). The gains 
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from cheating are reflected by the marginal rent available 
to the team from supplying violations. Therefore, the 
higher Pv is, the greater is the supply of violations and 
vice versa. Similarly, as monopsony power increases, the 
potential economic rents increase. For this reason, the 
supply of violations also increases with increased market 
power. Higher marginal costs of cheating discourage 
violations. Increases in the probability of punishment 
and/or sanctions will reduce the supply of violations. 
On the input side, student-athletes are viewed as 
utility maximizers where utility is a function of income. 
The decision to supply labor can be viewed as a portfolio 
allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize: 
[10] 
where utility, U, is a function of Yp income earned from 
the selection of a college sports program, and Yi, income 
earned from alternative employment opportunities. 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that the relationships 
between these variables are such that au, ayl > 0 I a2u1 a (Yi) 2 < 
0 1 au, oYi > 0 1 and a2u1 a (Yi) 2 < 0. The income defined by Y1 
includes sanctioned offers and the extra benefits from 
illegal offers. This utility maximization process results 
in a supply of labor function. 30 Traditionally, the student-
30 It is assumed that S/As realize there are a limited 
number of positions available for any particular program and 
a large pool of applicants. Therefore, it is the utility 
maximization of the most talented athletes that is described 
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athlete will supply sports labor for a particular program so 
long as she or he receives an in-kind (as allowed by NCAA 
rules) or cash (in violation of NCAA rules) payment in 
excess of her or his opportunity cost. Since the supply of 
labor depends in part upon the extra benefits from illegal 
offers, it follows that the demand for violations (by S/As) 
is derived from the supply of labor decision. 
As explained previously, this simultaneous relationship 
can be illustrated with the Mill-Edgeworth-Marshall 
reciprocal demand model. Figure 5 shows the student-athlete 
side of the trade-offs illustrated in Figure 3. In Figure 
5, panel (a), the vertical and horizontal axis remain 
labeled as in Figure 3(a). Focusing on the supply of 
student-athlete labor and demand for violations, it is 
evident that the flatter the line OA, the greater is the 
number of violations demanded to secure a given amount of 
student-athlete labor. Also, for increasing quantities of 
labor along a given willingness-to-cheat curve, the quantity 
of violations demanded increases. Thus, in Figure 5(b), a 
supply of student-athlete labor function is shown as SL and 
it is simultaneously equal to the demand for violations 
function, Dv in Figure 5(c). This demand for violations 
will exhibit the usual characteristics of neoclassical 
demand theory and the economics of crime literature. 
above. 
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Figure 5 The offer curve, OA, reflects the willingness of 
a S/A to exchange labor for violations. As the offer 
curve rotates to the right, more violations are required 
to secure the same amount of quality labor. 
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Formally, the demand for violations is defined as: 
Vd = Vd(Pv, GRANT, PROB) [11) 
where Pv is the price of violations, as described above; 
GRANT is the basic grant (legal offer) provided to athletes; 
and PROB is the probability of losing collegiate eligibility 
for violating NCAA rules. Based on neoclassical demand 
theory and the economics of crime literature, we can expect: 
avd/ aPV < o, 
avd/ a GRANT < 0, and 
avd/ a.PROB < 0. 
The willingness of student-athletes to violate NCAA rules 
will be inve~sely related to the NCAA sanctioned benefits 
and the probability of being punished. The product of these 
two variables represents the expected costs of crime. The 
relationship between the willingness to cheat and the price 
of violations is somewhat convoluted, since the price of 
violations is defined in terms of the benefit to the school 
(the difference between the marginal revenue product of 
student-athletes and the payments to student athletes) of 
violating NCAA regulations. 
There is a relationship, then, between the price of 
violations and the willingness of schools to cheat. As the 
price of violations rises, the schools' willingness to cheat 
increases because the reward, to the school, is rising. The 
divergence between the marginal revenue product and the 
official wage is the result of monopsony power. The greater 
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the market power of the schools, the fewer the alternatives 
left to the student-athlete, and, ceteris paribus, the less 
willing student-athletes will be to cheat. Therefore, for 
larger deviations between MRP and the sanctioned wage, the 
student-athletes will desire fewer violations. Accordingly, 
for smaller marginal rents, more violations are demanded. 
For larger marginal rents, less violations are demanded. 
Student-athletes are utility maximizers and schools are 
rent maximizers. The behavior of both participants can be 
described by the standard neoclassical theory of 
optimization. From this optimization activity, the 
traditional input demand and labor supply functions are 
derived. The input demand and labor supply functions, in a 
Mill-Edgeworth-Marshall framework, imply supply of and 
demand for violations. This framework can be used to 
further explore the connection between these two markets. 
Consider Figure 6, which brings Figures 3 through 5 
together in one set of graphs. -The curve OU in panel (a) 
defines the willingness to cheat in athletic programs. The 
OU curve, as noted above, can be used to define both a 
demand for student-athlete labor curve and a supply of NCAA 
violations curve as illustrated in panels (b) and (c). The 
OA curve in panel (a) shows the student-athletes' 
willingness to trade student-labor for violations. This 
curve can be used to derive a student-athlete labor supply 















Figure 6 The intersection of the offer curves, OU and OA, 
defines an equilibrium in both the labor and violations 
market. 
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(b) and (c), respectively. The results of this process are 
two markets which clear simultaneously. It is the 
intersection of the two willingness-to-cheat curves which 
provides equilibria in the two markets. 
With the simultaneous nature of these two markets 
established, estimation of only one of the markets is 
necessary to address the questions outlined in this 
dissertation. Hence, the applied model will deal solely 
with the violations market. Once supply and demand 
functions for violations are estimated, hypothesis tests can 
be performed. The results of these tests can be extended to 




AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF CHEATING 
IN SPORTS ADMINISTRATION 
An applied form of the theoretical model outlined in 
Chapter III must be assembled to test the hypothesis of this 
dissertation. This applied, or empirical, model will be 
fashioned in such a way as to render it "estimatable" 
through the use of econometric techniques. The empirical 
model consists of three endogenous variables: the quantity 
of violations supplied (V8 ), the quantity of violations 
demanded (Vd), and the price of violations (Pv) and four 
exogenous variables the costs of sanctions (FINE), the 
degree of market power exercised by the NCAA schools (MKT), 
the potential loss to student-athletes of NCAA sanctions 
(GRANT), and the probability of being punished (PROB). Data 
for collegiate football, basketball, and baseball are used 
to test the hypothesis that the market for violations is 
dependent on market structure. 
Observations for the violations variables, Vil are 
taken from the NCAA's Enforcement Summary of Division I 
Schools. This summary details all of the assigned penalties 
for schools in the sample. The data are discrete; the 
number 1 is used to signify a penalty while o is used 
otherwise. Because of the nature of this variable, a 
limited dependent model is utilized. This approach is 
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explained below. 
A proxy must be used for the price of violations. 
Because this price represents the deviation between the 
marginal revenue product of student-athletes and the 
sanctioned NCAA wage, an estimate of the difference between 
the two is calculated. Specifically, average annual 
professional salary data for each of the three sports serves 
as a proxy for student-athlete marginal revenue product 
while disaggregated scholarship expense data is used for the 
NCAA sanctioned wage. (Details are provided in Appendix A). 
It is expected that Pv will be positively related to V8 and 
negatively related to V0 • 
The cost of sanctions, FINE, is measured as the 
marginal increase or decrease in television revenues earned 
by each school lagged one year. First, won/loss records 
were compiled for all schools in the sample. Next, the 
change in the winning percentage for each school and sport 
was multiplied by the television revenues available to each 
school each year. 31 Thus, for example, teams experiencing a 
decrease in the number of games won are assigned a negative 
value for the FINE variable for that year. This method was 
used in Fleisher, et al. (1992). It is hypothesized that 
those schools coming off of a losing season will be more 
likely to cheat. Therefore, an inverse relationship is 
31 Revenues available were defined by an average of 
disbursements made to member schools over the period. 
62 
expected between FINE and Vs· 
The market power variable, MKT, is captured by a ratio 
of graduation rates. The student-athlete graduation rate of 
those completing eligibility is divided by the graduation 
rate of all other student-athletes. Thus, a value for this 
ratio greater than one signals relatively more monopsony 
power while values less than one signal relatively less 
monopsony power. The reasoning behind this is as follows. 
Student-athletes participating in sports with greater 
monopsony power will tend to exhaust eligibility before 
graduating. student-athletes with more alternative 
employment opportunities (baseball and basketball players) 
will graduate less often than student-athletes participating 
in sports with more monopsony power (football players). A 
collegiate baseball player can leave school, enter the farm 
system for Major League Baseball and matriculate into the 
big leagues. A collegiate football player does not 
generally have a similar option. Thus, the ratio will 
increase as monopsony power increases (i.e., increased 
monopsony power leads to more students completing 
eligibility). For this reason, the relationship between MKT 
and vs is expected to be direct. 
The potential sanction faced by student-athletes, 
GRANT, is estimated as the average net present value of the 
basic grant multiplied by the number of student-athletes for 
each sport. For example, in 1985, the average net present 
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value of the.basic grant was $7,000 per student. The 
average football roster for schools in the sample carries 
100 athletes. Thus, the GRANT total for football in 1985 
would be $7000 x 100 = $70,000. The student-athlete's 
demand for violations should decrease with an increase in 
GRANT. In other words, the smaller the deviation between 
the legal payment {GRANT) and the student-athlete MRP is, 
the smaller the quantity of violations demanded will be. 
Finally, the probability of punishment, PROB, is 
estimated from the NCAA data on enforcement. Specifically, 
a ratio of punishments to estimated violations was 
calculated. This ratio was then multiplied by 2 if the team 
experienced an increase in winning percentages from the 
previous season. Anecdotal evidence suggests schools which 
experience increased wins are often viewed with more 
suspicion by other NCAA members. Thus, it follows, they are 
more likely to "get caught" after a winning season. Both V8 
and V0 are expected to be inversely related to PROB. 
Getting caught and being punished discourages cheating 
on both sides of the market. Observations on these 
variables are limited to schools which have football, 
basketball, and baseball programs competing in Division IA 
and for which data were available. Specifically, the sample 





Big 10, and 
Big 8. 
There are 891 observations on 7 variables spanning the time 
period from 1983-1991. 32 
As with many econometric studies, limitations on the 
type of data available occurred. The following paragraphs 
define the nature and source of the data used including the 
construction of proxy variables. Several proxies were used 
due to the fact that some of explanatory variables are 
"unreported". For example, although some anecdotal evidence 
exists about the magnitude of illicit offerings to S/As, no 
one knows the precise dollar value of the covert 
transactions that are never revealed. 
Observations for the supply and demand of violations 
(Vi) were taken from the NCAA Enforcement summary. This 
summary reports public disciplinary actions taken by the 
Committee on Infractions or the NCAA Council from October 
16, 1952 to May 1, 1991. As explained in the text, the 
number 1 was used to signify a penalty and O was used 
otherwise for every school and sport each year sampled. 
The probabiliity of punishment variable, PROB, was 
measured using the enforcement data. A probability ratio of 
32 Data sources include: NCAA Enforcement Summary, 
NCAA News, College football U.S.A., Chronicle of Higher 
Education, World Almanac, NCAA Annual Reports, and athletic 
departments of various division I schools. 
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actual penalties to estimated violations was constructed for 
each year. Estimated violations are based on anecdotal 
evidence which suggests that approximately 30 percent of 
schools cheat. Thus, the denominator of the probability 
ratio is equivalent to 30 percent of the total Division I 
schools for each year. For example, in 1984 there were 988 
Division I schools with approximately 300 competing at the 
IA level. Roughly 100 (30 percent) of these schools 
probably cheated. There were 6 violations reported that 
year. Thus, the probability of getting caught is taken as 
6/100 or 0.06. This ratio was multiplied by 2 if the team 
experienced an increase in winning percentages from the 
previous season. 
The price variable, Pv, is constructed as the 
difference between what the S/A could potentially earn in 
the professional market (reflecting the S/A MRP) and what he 
legally receives as a S/A. Average annual salary data was 
taken from Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look Inside the 
Business of Our National Pastime, by Andrew Zimbalist (Basic 
Books, New York, NY) 1992, p.88. The grant information was 
taken from a study by Mitchell H. Raiborn entitled "Revenues 
and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs", (NCAA, 
Overland Park, KS) 1990, p.32-37. The difference between 
the two for each sport each year comprises the proxy for Pv. 
Additionally, observations for GRANT were also taken from 
the Raiborn study. GRANT, as described in the text, is the 
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average net present value of the basic grant multiplied by 
the number of S/As carried on a roster for each sport. 
The components of the FINE variable include won/loss 
records and television, bowl game, and tournament revenues. 
Won/loss records were taken from various years' World 
Almanacs. Revenue information was taken from the Raiborn 
study cited above pages 16-21. Finally, the MKT graduation 
rates were taken from the 1992-1993 NCAA Division I 
Graduation-Rates Report. 
Assuming linearity in the parameters, the applied 
form of the model is as follows: 
Vs - V0 = 0 [ 14] 
where Vs is the probability of supplying violations, V0 is 
the probability of demanding violations, aii are the 
coefficients to be estimated for the endogenous variables in 
each equation, bii are the coefficients to be estimated for 
the exogenous variables in each equation, and ei are random 
error terms. The expected relationships between the 
endogenous and exogenous variables are captured by the signs 
in equations [12] - [14]. It can be shown that this system 
of three equations is identified. 33 Therefore, parameters of 
the reduced form equations can be estimated. 
33 Rank and order conditions, as specified in Judge, et 
al., (188) pp 623-626, are met. 
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Due to the simultaneous nature of this system and the 
nature of the data, Ordinary Least Squares regression 
analysis may not be the best estimator. Because the data 
are censored (yearly observations are available for 
explanatory variables even though schools do not cheat every 
year) a nonlinear, maximum likelihood estimation technique 
is required. A simultaneous probit model is used to 
estimate parameter coefficients. Interpretation of the 
coefficients on the dependent variables, Vi, must be made 
with care. The observations on these variables utilize a 
limited dependent variable of zero (if the school did not 
experience a penalty) or one (if the school did receive a 
penalty). Therefore, regression of the independent 
variables on the limited dependent variables will yield 
estimates which translate into probabilities. 
The empirical model lends itself to several hypothesis 
tests. The first, and most important, involves the sign and 
significance of the coefficient on MKT. If the estimate of 
the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
then the basic premise of this dissertation is supported: 
market structure affects cheating in the predicted manner. 
Additionally, sensitivity tests on each of the exogenous 
variables may reveal the relative importance of each in 
explaining the variation in violations. For instance, what 
is the effect of an increase in MKT on cheating? How 
sensitive is the likelihood of cheating to GRANT or PROB? 
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Recognizing the dual nature of these estimated parameters, 
hypothesis tests like these will not only provide insight 
into the violations market, but also contribute to our 
understanding of the market for athletes as well. Again, 
the question we hope to answer is simple: does market 
structure (in particular, monopsony power) affect cheating? 
If empirical results suggest it does, then the implications 
from the violations market will spill over into the market 
for athletes. This dual nature of the markets for 




EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical results 
The results below summarize two different approaches to 
the empirical model. First, the simultaneous probit model 
was used on equations [12] and [13]. Second, a truncated 
regression technique was used on a hybrid reduced form 
equation. The first approach affirms our basic premise: 
monopsony power affects cheating. Additionally, these 
results confirm the simultaneous nature of the violations 
and student-athlete markets. The second approach offers a 
more focused view of the supply of cheating relationships. 
The two modeling techniques yield slightly different results 
and provide a point of comparison. A thorough discussion of 
each follows the tables below. 
Results from the simultaneous probit model of equations 
(12) and (13) are reported in Table 1, below. Of primary 
interest in Table 1 is the significance of the coefficient 
on MKT in the vs equation. A one-tailed t-test allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to 
zero at the 5 percent level. In other words, we reject the 
hypothesis that MKT has no effect in favor of the 





































Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
Level of significance: * = .05 
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probability of cheating. This result confirms the central 
hypothesis of this research: monopsony power (as captured 
by the graduation rate ratio) affects cheating in the NCAA. 
An obvious next step in this line of inquiry is to test 
whether the probabilities of cheating are different for each 
sport. Linking the differences in probabilities of cheating 
to the MKT variable could provide additional tools to the 
enforcement committee of the NCAA. 
The coefficient on PRICE is also significant and of the 
expected sign for V8 • This result confirms the theoretical 
premise that schools will produce more violations in 
response to a higher benefit, or rent, obtained per 
violation. This relationship confirms the simple (but not 
trivial) direct relation between price and quantity supplied 
predicted by economic theory. Though the PRICE coefficient 
is significant for Vn, it is not of the expected sign. This 
result, though troublesome, does not necessarily invalidate 
the model. One possible explanation lies within the data. 
As mentioned, the observations for PRICE are proxies for the 
unobservable payment for a violation. Perhaps, on the 
demand side, this proxy is inadequate. S/A MRPs vary across 
individuals. It could be that actual S/A MRPs are more 
widely distributed than those utilized in the proxy 
variable. This could possibly explain the positive sign. 
Empirical results for FINE do not support the 
proposition that punishment deters crime in the NCAA. While 
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the coefficient is of the appropriate sign, (FINE is 
inversely related to Vs) it is insignificant. This 
insignificance probably relates to the way that NCAA 
sanctions are enforced. Generally, it is the athletic 
program that bears the costs of any sanctions and not the 
individuals committing the violations. 
The coefficient on PROB is of the expected sign in both 
Vs, and V0 , however both estimates are not significantly 
different from zero. In this sample the probabilities of 
getting caught and/or losing eligibility are apparently too 
small to make a measurable difference. It should be noted 
that the relatively low probability of being punished could 
be contributing to the insignificance of the severity of 
punishment. 
Finally, the coefficient on GRANT is negative as 
expected, but insignificant. The sign suggests (as theory 
does) that as the value of the basic grant increases, the 
probable demand for violations decreases. An inverse 
relationship indicates stud~nt-athletes are less likely to 
demand illegal payments when they are being paid more for 
their talents as athletes. Taken to the extreme, one might 
argue that if the market for collegiate athletes were 
competitive, no cheating would occur at all. If this were 
the case, hypothetically, as GRANT approached the true value 
of student-athlete MRPs, V0 should approach zero. 
Based on the empirical results from the simultaneous 
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probit model, a market for violations appears to exist and 
one of its determinants is market structure as defined by 
monopsony power. The other theorized determinants, however, 
are not evidenced by this model. This market obviously has 
a price, as well, to which suppliers and demanders of 
violations respond. In order to examine the postulated 
counterpart to this market, all that is necessary is a 
change of labels. Recall from Chapter III that (in a 
Marshall-Edgeworth exposition) the supply of violations is 
equivalent to a demand for quality student-athletes. 
Likewise, the demand for violations is equivalent to a 
supply of student-athletes. Thus, the results summarized 
above can be applied to the intuitive parallel market as 
well. 34 
Because of the emphasis in the economics of crime 
literature on the supply of cheating (and the greater 
interest on the part of enforcers to predict crime), a 
separate model for a hybrid reduced form equation was 
estimated using a truncated regression technique. The term 
hybrid is fitting because it describes the components of the 
function well. Elements of both the original supply and 
demand equations estimated above were included in the 
34 The interpretation of the exogenous variables is 
straightforward for each market. The endogenously 
determined prices do not "translate" directly to the market 
for student-athletes, however. In order to conform with 
standard neoclassical theory, the signs of the price 
coefficients must be reversed. 
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truncated function with interesting results. The results 
from the truncated regression are summarized in Table 2, 
below. The truncated regression model is estimated from a 
subset of the data. In order to focus on the supply of 
cheating, only the 45 "cheaters" were included in the 
sample. That is, the observations for which V was equal to 
1 were included in the regression. The results in Table 2 
are interesting for two reasons: 1) they differ from the 
simultaneous probit model results and 2) they suggest 
directions for further research on the supply side of the 
model. 
Once again, the coefficient on the MKT variable is 
positive and significant indicating that the amount of 
cheating that one can expect in a cartel is directly related 
to the market power exercised by the cartel. The PROB 
coefficient is also negative but insignificant. The 
probability of getting caught does not have a deterrent 
effect on cheating in this model. Upon reflection, though, 
the NCAA enforcement data revealed that many schools are 
repeat offenders (i.e., have multiple penalties through the 






















Level of significance: * = .05 
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FINE is inversely related to Vs in this formulation. 
The coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent 
level. This inverse relationship indicates that sanctions 
are a deterrent. 
conclusions 
The empirical evidence supports the main hypothesis 
that market structure plays a significant role in the 
decision to cheat on the NCAA cartel agreement. Monopsony 
power creates economic rents. Schools seek to maximize 
rents and, in the process, break NCAA rules regarding the 
recruitment and maintenance of student-athletes. The 
theoretical model of this dissertation provides the 
foundation for the model of crime in sports administration. 
While the neoclassical approach yields a supply and demand 
framework easily adapted to the economics of crime 
literature, there are certainly other approaches to the 
theoretical design of the model. Not the least of these is 
the agency theory concept addressed in chapter III. Another 
strategy might eliminate equilibrium analysis altogether and 
focus on the input demand function itself. Violations could 
be viewed as simply another input demanded by the school in 
the production of higher winning percentages. The 
advantage, however, of the model herein developed is its 
compatibility with the existing research. The significance 
of the MKT variable in this model is a key which opens the 
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door to more understanding of cartel behavior. 
Since varying degrees of monopsony power affect the 
amount of cheating within the NCAA, knowledge of the balance 
of market power within the cartel could lead to increased 
awareness of potential violators. For example, if a 
particular program appears to consistently attract top 
quality S/As by flexing its market power, economic rents to 
the school should increase. The NCAA's enforcement team 
could then watch for suspicious activity instead of waiting 
for reports of recruiting violations. In addition, the 
model could be adapted to any other monopsonistic industry 
(health care for example). 
Another useful application of the theoretical model is 
the establishment of the reciprocal nature of supply and 
demand for violations. One obvious next step in this 
research agenda is to test the model on the intuitive 
parallel market: the demand and supply of S/A labor. By 
introducing the criminal behavior perspective, an 
alternative approach to traditional labor market analysis 
could be developed. 
Some of the more interesting questions which could be 
addressed include the following. Given data on the 
determinants of the reduced form equation, is it possible to 
predict which schools and/or sports will be more likely to 
cheat? Because the supply of violations relationship can be 
translated into a demand for student-athletes, can a market 
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clearing price, or illegal offer, be determined? What are 
the implications of a change in the degree of monopsony 
among the various sports? For example, if the professional 
leagues vertically integrate into the NCAA input markets, 
will the amount of cheating increase or decrease? Another 
line of inquiry could explore the effect on antitrust 
exemption of professional and amateur sports. Should the 
government reverse its current stance, will the cartel lose 
power? If so, will NCAA members cheat more or less as 
cartel power wanes? This dissertation links the economics of 
crime with cartel theory. The model of crime in sports 
administration developed herein provides insight into, not 
only the market for cheating, but potentially also the 
market for athletes. The dual nature of this model 
contributes a new perspective on this aspect of cartel 
theory. 
The critical question answered by this research is the 
following. Does market structure affect cheating in the 
NCAA? The answer is yes--relative monopsony power helps to 
explain the cheating that occurs. Thus, this particular 
aspect of cartel behavior has been explained in a new way. 
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APPENDIX 
The data employed in the dissertation is provided 
below. 
YR SC SP C MKT V PROB GRANT PRICE FINE 
1982 PT PTB 1 1.064 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -1.3470 
1982 OH OHB 1 0.770 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.7936 
1982 NU NUB 1 0.173 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.0000 
1982 WI WIB 1 0.193 1 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.0000 
1982 IL ILB 1 0.837 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 3.1182 
1982 WF WFB 1 0.977 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.6236 
1982 NR NRB 1 1.010 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 1.1592 
1982 cs CSB 1 0,833 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.3811 
1982 NCS NCSB 1 0.083 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.5800 
1982 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.8575 
1982 IN INB 1 0.561 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.3630 
1982 PR PRB 1 0.379 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 1.5244 
1982 NC NCB 1 0.537 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -1. 0170 
1982 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.8575 
1982 MR MRB 1 0.441 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 1. 0960 
1982 OS OSB 1 0.172 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 1.0901 
1982 IS ISB 1 0.600 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 1.2473 
1982 KU KUB 1 0.434 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.6160 
1982 MN MNB 1 0.614 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.3630 
1982 V VB 1 0.761 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -1. 3720 
1982 MIS MISB 1 0.985 0 0.0069 22.06 2.4632 -0.3670 
1982 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -1. 3160 
1982 IU IUB 1 0.788 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.5710 
1982 OU OUB 1 0.428 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 1. 0336 
1982 MI MIB 1 0.761 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.6737 
1982 CL CLB 1 0.617 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 0.2807 
1982 MF MFB 1 0.402 0 0.0069 22.60 1. 2292 -3.4300 
1982 p PB 1 0.574 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 -0.9870 
1982 SJ SJB 1 0.750 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 -0.1050 
1982 GT GTB 1 0.476 0 0.0139 22.60 2.4632 1. 5327 
1982 KS KSB 1 1. 531 0 0.0069 22.60 2.4632 0.0000 
1983 OH OHB 1 0.770 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 0.7936 
1983 CL CLB 1 0.617 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 0.2807 
1983 cs CSB 1 0.833 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 0.3811 
1983 OS OSB 1 0.172 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 1. 0901 
1983 MN MNB 1 0.614 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.3630 
1983 OU OUB 1 0.428 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 1.0336 
1983 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -1. 3160 
1983 NR NRB 1 1.010 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 1.1592 
1983 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 0.8575 
1983 PT PTB 1 1. 064 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -1. 34 70 
1983 MIS MISB 1 0.985 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.3670 
1983 SJ SJB 1 0.750 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.1050 
1983 GT GTB 1 0.476 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 1. 5327 
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1983 NC NCB 1 0.537 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -1. 0170 
1983 IL !LB 1 0.837 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 3.1182 
1983 WI WIB 1 0.193 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 0.0000 
1983 MI MIB 1 0.761 0 0.0343 23.70 3.1209 0.6737 
1983 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0343 22.60 3.1209 0.8575 
1983 IN !NB 1 0.561 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.3630 
1983 p PB 1 0.574 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.9870 
1983 MF MFB 1 0.402 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -3.4300 
1983 NCS NCSB 1 0.083 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.5800 
1983 IS !SB 1 0.600 0 0.0343 22.60 3.1209 1. 24 73 
1983 WF WFB 1 0.977 0 0.0343 22.60 3.1209 0.6236 
1983 IU IUB 1 0.788 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.5710 
1983 NU NUB 1 0.173 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 0.0000 
1983 KS KSB 1 1. 531 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 0.0000 
1983 V VB 1 0.761 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -1.3720 
1983 PR PRB 1 0.379 0 0.0343 22.60 3.1209 1. 5244 
1983 MR MRB 1 0.441 0 0.0343 22.60 3.1209 1. 0960 
1983 KU KUB 1 0.434 0 0.0171 23.70 3.1209 -0.6160 
1984 KU KUB 1 0.434 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.7970 
1984 OH OHB 1 0.770 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.2550 
1984 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -1. 0130 
1984 IU IUB 1 0.788 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 0.0000 
1984 OS OSB 1 0.172 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.0084 
1984 MI MIB 1 0.761 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.3938 
1984 OU OUB 1 0.428 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.9010 
1984 MIS MISB 1 0.985 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 1. 4280 
1984 D DB 1 1. 010 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.0960 
1984 IN INB 1 0.561 1 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 1.8175 
1984 p PB 1 0.574 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.5648 
1984 NC NCB 1 0.537 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.9222 
1984 PR PRB 1 0.379 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -3.5670 
1984 NCS NCSB 1 0.083 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.0700 
1984 cs CSB 1 0.833 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.4540 
1984 GT GTB 1 0.476 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.9098 
1984 PT PTB 1 0.806 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.4540 
1984 KS KSB 1 1. 531 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.6059 
1984 SJ SJB 1 0.750 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.1657 
1984 IS !SB 1 0.600 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -1.3210 
1984 CL CLB 1 0.617 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.1970 
1984 MR MRB 1 0.441 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -1. 0920 
1984 V VB 1 0.761 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.1250 
1984 NR NRB 1 1. 010 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.1510 
1984 WF WFB 1 0.977 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 2.6436 
1984 MF MFB 1 0.402 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 1. 2117 
1984 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -0.2560 
1984 IL !LB 1 0.837 0 0.0202 26.66 3.7748 -1. 9820 
1984 MN MNB 1 0.614 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 1. 0386 
1984 NU NUB 1 0.173 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 1. 7309 
1984 WI WIB 1 0.193 0 0.0404 26.66 3.7748 0.3853 
1985 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.2560 
1985 OH OHB 1 0.770 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.3070 
1985 KU KUB 1 0.434 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.3860 
83 
1985 CL CLB 1 0.617 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.7000 
1985 MF MFB 1 0.402 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.6417 
1985 WI WIB 1 0.193 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.0810 
1985 PR PRB 1 0.379 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1.1550 
1985 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.2962 
1985 MI MIB 1 0.761 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1. 3790 
1985 GT GTB 1 0.476 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.4800 
1985 MIS MISB 1 0.985 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.2930 
1985 V VB 1 0.761 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.9670 
1985 p PB 1 0.574 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.5839 
1985 IS ISB 1 0.600 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -2.1000 
1985 MN MNB 1 0.614 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.2750 
1985 IU IUB 1 0.784 1 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1.2830 
1985 MR MRB 1 0.441 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1. 3060 
1985 PT PTB 1 0.806 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1.5160 
1985 OU OUB 1 0.428 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.2370 
1985 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.9196 
1985 NC NCB 1 0.537 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.6783 
1985 IL ILB 1 0.837 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 2.1000 
1985 NCS NCSB 1 0.000 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 1. 2405 
1985 SJ SJB 1 0.000 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.6417 
1985 OS OSB 1 0.172 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1.1000 
1985 cs CSB 1 0.833 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 1.4437 
1985 NR NRB 1 1.010 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -0.5610 
1985 IN INB 1 0.561 1 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 1. 3839 
1985 WF WFB 1 0.977 0 0.0203 33.83 4.4200 0.9333 
1985 KS KSB 1 0.000 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 -1.0360 
1985 NU NUB 1 0.000 0 0.0101 33.83 4.4200 0.0000 
1986 KS KSB 1 0.000 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 2.0530 
1986 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 -0.8610 
1986 CL CLB 1 0.617 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 -1. 3700 
1986 OS OSB 1 0.172 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1.4751 
1986 MN MNB 1 0.614 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1.4751 
1986 OU OUB 1 0.428 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 0.4958 
1986 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 -0.1390 
1986 NR NRB 1 1. 010 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1. 0357 
1986 D DB 1 1. 010 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 -1.0590 
1986 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1.1775 
1986 MIS MISB 1 0.985 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -3.8460 
1986 SJ SJB 1 0.000 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 0.2463 
1986 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0201 35.70 5.0761 1. 8840 
1986 NC NCB 1 0.537 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -0.6560 
1986 GT GTB 1 0.476 0 0.0201 35.70 5.0761 0.3200 
1986 WI WIB 1 0.193 1 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -1.2130 
1986 MI MIB 1 0.761 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1.7662 
1986 OH OHB 1 0.770 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -0.4210 
1986 IL ILB 1 1.175 0 0.0201 35.70 5.0761 1. 9268 
1986 p PB 1 0.574 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 0.5676 
1986 MF MFB 1 0.402 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 0.7850 
1986 NCS NCSB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -1. 4650 
1986 IN INB 1 0.561 1 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 -1. 2840 
1986 WF WFB 1 0.977 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -1.1410 
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1986 IS ISB 1 0.600 0 0.0201 35.70 5.0761 3.4254 
1986 NU NUB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -1. 9430 
1986 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0201 35.70 5.0761 2.3550 
1986 V VB 1 0.761 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 1. 8690 
1986 PR PRB 1 0.379 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 2.1980 
1986 MR MRB 1 0.441 0 0.0333 35.70 5.0761 -0.3360 
1986 KU KUB 1 0.434 0 0.0100 35.70 5.0761 0.9356 
1987 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.3307 
1987 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.8125 
1987 NU NUB 1 0.186 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.8254 
1987 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.2783 
1987 OU OUB 1 0.457 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.2450 
1987 IN INB 1 0.808 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1. 7720 
1987 WF WFB 1 1. 000 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -3.5450 
1987 CL CLB 1 1.148 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 1. 5758 
1987 SJ SJB 1 0.781 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -2.0550 
1987 D DB 1 1. 010 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.6472 
1987 MN MNB 1 0.885 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.7500 
1987 NCS NCSB 1 0.097 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.7222 
1987 MIS MISB 1 1.147 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 4.0625 
1987 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1.9860 
1987 OS OSB 1 0.551 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -2.5000 
1987 NC NCB 1 1. 075 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1. 5120 
1987 IS ISB 1 0.833 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 2.3636 
1987 IL ILB 1 1.175 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -3.8000 
1987 MI MIB 1 0.727 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.8120 
1987 V VB 1 0.880 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 0.2063 
1987 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 1. 0833 
1987 PR PRB 1 0.988 0 0.0033 37.56 5.7322 2.7957 
1987 MF MFB 1 0.695 0 0.0333 37.56 3.0782 -3.2500 
1987 GT GTB 1 0.928 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.3470 
1987 KS KSB 1 1. 428 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1. 3780 
1987 p PB 1 0.689 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1. 3460 
1987 NR NRB 1 0.888 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -1.3480 
1987 OH OHB 1 1.149 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.8940 
1987 WI WIB 1 0.329 1 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -2.6590 
1987 MR MRB 1 0.813 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.2090 
1987 KU KUB 1 0.723 0 0.0333 37.56 5.7322 -0.7010 
1988 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -2.5650 
1988 NR NRB 1 0.888 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.1620 
1988 SJ SJB 1 0.781 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1.4725 
1988 IN INB 1 0.808 1 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -1. 2520 
1988 MR MRB 1 0.813 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -2.2380 
1988 KU KUB 1 0.723 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1. 7179 
1988 OS OSB 1 0.551 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1.5558 
1988 KS KSB 1 1. 428 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1. 4615 
1988 IL !LB 1 1.175 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -3.7580 
1988 NCS NCSB 1 0.097 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.1253 
1988 MI MIB 1 0.727 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.0000 
1988 WF WFB 1 1. 000 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 5.4285 
1988 PR PRB 1 0.988 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -2.4530 
1988 GT GTF 1 0.946 0 0.0196 38.70 3.4519 0.6177 
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1988 CL CLB 1 1.148 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1. 7563 
1988 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1. 0762 
1988 WI WIB 1 0.329 1 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.3132 
1988 OU OUB 1 0.457 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.0600 
1988 IS ISB 1 0.833 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 1.6703 
1988 V VB 1 0.88 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.5250 
1988 MN MNB 1 0.885 1 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -4.9210 
1988 p PB 1 0.689 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.2220 
1988 MIS MISB 1 1.147 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.8610 
1988 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -3.4450 
1988 NU NUB 1 0.186 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.4920 
1988 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -0.3170 
1988 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.8612 
1988 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.0547 
1988 NC NCB 1 1. 075 0 0.0333 38.70 6.3899 -3.2310 
1988 MF MFB 1 0.695 0 0.0333 38.70 3.4519 -2.2960 
1988 OH OHB 1 1.149 0 0.0196 38.70 6.3899 0.6600 
1989 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 1. 4121 
1989 IN INB 1 0.808 1 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 3.1614 
1989 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -2.5990 
1989 GT GTB 1 0.928 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -1. 8420 
1989 V VB 1 0.880 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -0.7210 
1989 OH OHB 1 1.149 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.6897 
1989 CL CLB 1 1.148 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.0000 
1989 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 2.3183 
1989 p PB 1 0.689 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.0612 
1989 MF MFB 1 0.695 0 0.0066 41. 60 3.8219 10.4320 
1989 KU KUB 1 0.723 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.6641 
1989 IL ILB 1 1.175 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 1. 2645 
1989 KS KSB 1 1.428 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -5.1710 
1989 IS ISB 1 0.833 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.0000 
1989 SJ SJB 1 0.781 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -1.5160 
1989 OU OUB 1 0.457 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.4272 
1989 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -0.0660 
1989 NR NRB 1 0.888 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 2.9456 
1989 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 4.6900 
1989 MR MRB 1 0.813 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.4968 
1989 PR PRB 1 0.988 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -2.6670 
1989 WF WFB 1 1. 000 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -0.4210 
1989 NU NUB 1 0.186 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.0000 
1989 MI MIBB 1 0.727 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -1. 3660 
1989 NC NCB 1 1. 075 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 3.6303 
1989 WI WIB 1 0.329 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -2.5290 
1989 MIS MISB 1 1.147 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 2.7323 
1989 NCS NCSB 1 0.097 0 0.0066 41. 60 7.0439 0.3980 
1989 OS OSB 1 0.551 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -0.5760 
1989 MN MNB 1 0.885 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -0.4960 
1989 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0333 41. 60 7.0439 -4.7000 
1990 SJ SJB 1 0.781 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -1. 7160 
1990 WF WFB 1 1. 000 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 2.8955 
1990 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 3.5705 
1990 MR MRB 1 0.813 1 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 3.6750 
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1990 NR NRB 1 0.888 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -0.8710 
1990 NC NCB 1 1. 075 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -4.5690 
1990 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -2.6250 
1990 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 1. 5750 
1990 p PB 1 0.689 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 0.2439 
1990 MN MNB 1 0.885 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 2.6250 
1990 NU NUB 1 0.186 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 1.0500 
1990 NCS NCSB 1 0.097 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -1.6560 
1990 MF MFB 1 0.695 0 0.0333 53.00 4.1743 -7.3500 
1990 PR PRB 1 0.988 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 1.1861 
1990 WI WIB 1 0.329 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 1. 3364 
1990 IS ISB 1 0.833 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -3.1180 
1990 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 1.2250 
1990 OS OSB 1 0.551 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -0.3000 
1990 CL CLB 1 1.148 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -1.1730 
1990 IL ILB 1 1.175 0 0.0333 53.00 7. 6803. -4.0090 
1990 OU OUB 1 0.457 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 0.9498 
1990 V VB 1 0.880 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -4.3550 
1990 KS KSB 1 1. 428 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -0.1020 
1990 MIS MISB 1 1.147 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -1. 5750 
1990 KU KUB 1 0.723 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -0.0640 
1990 GT GTB 1 0.928 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 0.8588 
1990 OH OHB 1 1.149 0 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -3.1700 
1990 IN INB 1 0.808 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 4.9000 
1990 FR FRB 1 0.000 1 0.0333 53.00 7.6803 -1. 8390 
1990 MI MIB 1 0.727 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 0.9333 
1990 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0166 53.00 7.6803 0.8300 
1991 BC BCB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -0.9360 
1991 V VB 1 0.880 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 1. 4637 
1991 NC NCB 1 1. 075 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 4.1401 
1991 PR PRB 1 0.988 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 3.7562 
1991 CL CLB 1 1.148 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -0.9130 
1991 NU NUB 1 0.186 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.0000 
1991 OU OUB 1 0.457 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -0.2660 
1991 KS KSB 1 1.428 1 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 3.0885 
1991 cs CSB 1 0.333 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 1. 2209 
1991 NR NRB 1 0.888 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -2.0490 
1991 D DB 1 1.010 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.9200 
1991 WF WFB 1 1. 000 0 0.0333 58.50 7.1289 -2.4260 
1991 p PB 1 0.689 1 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -2.2500 
1991 MR MRB 1 0.813 1 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 1.5600 
1991 MI MIB 1 0.727 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -4.0440 
1991 FR FRB 1 0.000 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -1.2450 
1991 SJ SJB 1 0.781 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.9394 
1991 MN MNB 1 0.885 1 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 4.4100 
1991 IN INB 1 0.808 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -2.4260 
1991 MIS MISB 1 1.147 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.0000 
1991 MF MFB 1 0.695 0 0.0333 58.50 4.5389 -1.2130 
1991 IL ILB 1 1.175 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 13.3460 
1991 OH OHB 1 1.149 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -2.3000 
1991 WI WIB 1 0.329 0 0.0333 58.50 7.1289 -1. 3230 
1991 IS ISB 1 0.833 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.6618 
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1991 GT GTB 1 0.928 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.7882 
1991 KU KUB 1 0.723 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -0.8080 
1991 IU IUB 1 1. 035 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -0.4460 
1991 NCS NCSB 1 0.097 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 1.1776 
1991 PT PTB 1 1. 080 0 0.0333 58.50 8.3289 -1.4050 
1991 OS OSB 1 0.551 0 0.0266 58.50 8.3289 0.3300 
1982 PR PRF 2 0.540 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -1. 8700 
1982 MN MNF 2 0.600 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -1. 8700 
1982 OU OUF 2 0.800 0 0.0139 6.78 1.2292 -1. 7150 
1982 MR MRF 2 0.581 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -1.8700 
1982 IU IUF 2 0.682 0 0.0069 6.78 1.2292 -1. 7760 
1982 KS KSF 2 0.628 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 -2.7940 
1982 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 -0.1550 
1982 PT PTF 2 0.612 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -0.6430 
1982 MI MIF 2 0.545 0 0.0069 6.78 2.3982 0.5947 
1982 NCS NCSF 2 0.752 0 0.0139 6.78 1.2292 1.0797 
1982 NC NCF 2 0.402 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -1. 3010 
1982 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 2.8425 
1982 FR FRF 2 0.666 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 0.2602 
1982 IL ILF 2 0.887 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 0.6125 
1982 OS OSF 2 0.534 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 0.0000 
1982 SJ SJF 2 0.781 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 0.0000 
1982 NU NUF 2 0.400 0 0.0139 6.78 1.2292 1. 8709 
1982 GT GTF 2 0.806 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 0.0200 
1982 IN INF 2 0.808 0 0.0139 6.78 1.2292 -1.5920 
1982 KU KUF 2 0.565 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 2.2867 
1982 WF WFF 2 0.806 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 1.1757 
1982 IS ISF 2 0.555 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 0.2541 
1982 MIS MISF 2 0.852 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -2.3120 
1982 MF MF 2 0.682 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -0.9860 
1982 CL CLF 2 0.333 1 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -0.9950 
1982 WI WIF 2 0.969 1 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 -0.6230 
1982 OH OHF 2 0.724 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 1. 7150 
1982 p PF 2 1.149 0 0.0069 6.78 1. 2292 0.5717 
1982 NR NRF 2 0.757 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 1. 2473 
1982 D DF 2 0.848 0 0.0069 6.78 1.2292 -1. 3460 
1982 BC BCF 2 0.852 0 0.0139 6.78 1. 2292 1.4500 
1983 SJ SJF 2 0.781 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 0.0000 
1983 p PF 2 1.149 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 0.5717 
1983 GT GTF 2 0.806 1 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 0.0245 
1983 OH OHF 2 0.724 0 0.0343 7.11 1.6029 1. 7150 
1983 WF WFF 2 0.806 0 0.0343 7.11 1.6029 1.1757 
1983 KS KSF 2 0.628 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -2.7940 
1983 MIS MISF 2 0.852 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -2.3120 
1983 NC NCF 2 0.402 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 3010 
1983 NR NRF 2 0.757 0 0.0343 7.11 1.6029 1.2473 
1983 IS ISF 2 0.555 0 0.0343 7.11 1.6029 0.2541 
1983 FR FRF 2 0.378 1 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 3.1702 
1983 IN INF 2 0.808 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 5920 
1983 D DF 2 0.848 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 3460 
1983 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0171 7.11 1.6029 -0.1550 
1983 OU OUF 2 0.800 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 7150 
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1983 PR PRF 2 0.540 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 8700 
1983 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 2.8425 
1983 BC BCF 2 0.852 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 1.4500 
1983 MR MRF 2 0.581 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 8700 
1983 IU IUF 2 0.682 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1.7760 
1983 MN MNF 2 0.600 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -1. 8700 
1983 PT PTF 2 0.612 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -0.6430 
1983 CL CLF 2 0.333 1 0.0171 7.11 1.6029 -0.9950 
1983 MI MIF 2 0.545 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 0.5947 
1983 OS OSF 2 0.534 0 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 0.0000 
1983 KU KUF 2 0.565 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 2.2867 
1983 NU NUF 2 0.400 1 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 1. 8709 
1983 NCS NCSF 2 0.752 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 1.0797 
1983 MF MF 2 0.682 1 0.0171 7.11 3.1209 -0.9860 
1983 IL ILF 2 0.887 0 0.0343 7.11 1. 6029 0.6125 
1983 WI WIF 2 0.969 1 0.0171 7.11 1. 6029 -0.6230 
1984 IS ISF 2 0.555 0 0.0404 8.00 1.9728 0.6828 
1984 MR MRF 2 0.581 0 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -1.3210 
1984 NC NCF 2 0.402 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 2.0387 
1984 CL CLF 2 0.333 1 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -1.0000 
1984 NCS NCSF 2 0.752 0 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -1.1140 
1984 D DF 2 0.848 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 0.1635 
1984 NR NRF 2 0.757 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -1. 9820 
1984 GT GTF 2 0.806 0 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -0.0820 
1984 NU NUF 2 0.400 1 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -0.6600 
1984 IN INF 2 0.808 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 2.4466 
1984 OH OHF 2 0.724 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 0.0000 
1984 KS KSF 2 0.628 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 2.1541 
1984 OS OSF 2 0.534 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 0.0000 
1984 MF MF 2 0.682 0 0.0404 8.00 3.7748 0.2908 
1984 OU OUF 2 0.800 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 2.4233 
1984 MIS MISF 2 0.852 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 1.7406 
1984 p PF 2 1.149 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 0.0000 
1984 BC BCF 2 0.852 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 0.6058 
1984 PR PRF 2 0.540 0 0.0404 8.00 1.9728 0.4957 
1984 FR FRF 2 0.666 1 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -1. 6960 
1984 PT PTF 2 0.612 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 1.1700 
1984 IU IUF 2 0.682 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 1. 3 631 
1984 SJ SJF 2 0.781 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -0.1860 
1984 MI MIF 2 0.545 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -0.0680 
1984 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -1. 9820 
1984 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 1. 3631 
1984 WF WFF 2 0.806 0 0.0202 8.00 1. 9728 -1. 4430 
1984 KU KUF 2 0.565 0 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -1. 2110 
1984 IL ILF 2 0.887 0 0.0202 8.00 1.9728 -3.4530 
1984 MN MNF 2 0.600 0 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 1. 3218 
1984 WI WIF 2 0.969 1 0.0404 8.00 1. 9728 0.6609 
1985 PT PTF 2 0.612 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.4813 
1985 WI WIF 2 0.969 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 1. 4000 
1985 NU NUF 2 0.400 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1.1000 
1985 GT GTF 2 0.806 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -2.0310 
1985 p PF 2 1.149 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 0.0000 
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1985 BC BCF 2 0.852 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1.4850 
1985 PR PRF 2 0.540 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.8750 
1985 NCS NCSF 2 0.752 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 1.1000 
1985 SJ SJF 2 0.781 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.2852 
1985 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1. 4110 
1985 MIS MISF 2 0.852 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.8250 
1985 NC NCF 2 0.402 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.2750 
1985 IL ILF 2 0.887 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.4080 
1985 MR MRF 2 0.581 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.8250 
1985 IN INF 2 0.808 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.4730 
1985 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 1. 2833 
1985 MI MIF 2 0.545 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1. 7810 
1985 FR FRF 2 0.666 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.8823 
1985 IS ISF 2 0.555 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.6733 
1985 NR NRF 2 0.757 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 0.0000 
1985 MF MF 2 0.682 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.0780 
1985 OH OHF 2 0.724 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1. 2830 
1985 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.7000 
1985 0 OF 2 0.848 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 2.5750 
1985 WF WFF 2 0.806 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -0.6230 
1985 IU IUF 2 0.682 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 2.0000 
1985 KU KUF 2 0.565 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 -1.9250 
1985 OS OSF 2 0.534 0 0.0101 10.15 2.3340 0.0000 
1985 CL CLF 2 0.333 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 1.1177 
1985 MN MNF 2 0.600 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 1.0500 
1985 KS KSF 2 0.628 0 0.0203 10.15 2.3340 0.6663 
1986 OH OHF 2 0.724 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -0.7850 
1986 FR FRF 2 0.666 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 -0.3810 
1986 PT PTF 2 0.612 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -0.6240 
1986 KU KUF 2 0.565 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 4.7100 
1986 MR MRF 2 0.581 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 2.0695 
1986 BC BCF 2 0.852 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 -4.7100 
1986 MN MNF 2 0.600 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.7850 
1986 CL CLF 2 0.333 0 0.0201 10.71 2.7061 0.8722 
1986 SJ SJF 2 0.781 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.5483 
1986 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -1.5700 
1986 GT GTF 2 0.806 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 -1.0090 
1986 NCS NCSF 2 0.752 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -1.6240 
1986 MIS MISF 2 0.852 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 2.2773 
1986 NC NCF 2 0.402 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -0.6000 
1986 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -3.4250 
1986 PR PRF 2 0.540 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.4995 
1986 IL ILF 2 0.887 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.0000 
1986 IU IUF 2 0.847 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.9028 
1986 IN INF 2 0.808 0 0.0201 10.71 2.7061 0.9420 
1986 OS OSF 2 0.534 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.0000 
1986 WF WFF 2 0.806 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.8971 
1986 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 -0.1040 
1986 MI MIF 2 0.545 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.2748 
1986 0 OF 2 0.848 0 0.0201 10.71 2.7061 0.4758 
1986 IS ISF 2 0.555 0 0.0201 10.71 2.7061 0.6209 
1986 NU NUF 2 0.400 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.8563 
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1986 WI WIF 2 0.969 0 0.0333 10.71 2.7061 -1. 7120 
1986 p PF 2 1.149 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.7850 
1986 NR NRF 2 0.757 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 0.0000 
1986 KS KSF 2 0.628 0 0.0100 10.71 2.7061 1. 8441 
1986 MF MF 2 0.682 0 0.0333 10.71 5.0761 -0.9000 
1987 GT GTF 2 0.946 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 2.0472 
1987 BC BCF 2 0.989 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 5.1212 
1987 MN MNF 2 0. 671 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 0.4924 
1987 NU NUF 2 0.560 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 1.1818 
1987 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -2.1660 
1987 CL CLF 2 0.716 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -0.5740 
1987 IL ILF 2 1. 000 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 6.7500 
1987 NR NRF 2 0.888 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 5.9091 
1987 SJ SJF 2 1.468 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -1. 2200 
1987 WF WFF 2 0.897 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 1. 0400 
1987 MIS MISF 2 1.136 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -0.1770 
1987 D DF 2 0.939 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 2.1242 
1987 IN INF 2 0.775 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -0.8120 
1987 NC NCF 2 0.666 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -1. 3220 
1987 MI MIF 2 0.852 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 0.4875 
1987 MR MRF 2 0.651 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -0.4920 
1987 p PF 2 1. 022 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 2.1660 
1987 KS KSF 2 1. 514. 0 0.0333 11.27 3.0782 -0.6870 
1987 IS !SF 2 0.477 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 0.6373 
1987 WI WIF 2 1.169 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 1.1818 
1987 PT PTF 2 0.822 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 0.2258 
1987 NCS NCSF 2 0.795 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 1. 0412 
1987 MF MF 2 0.548 0 0.0033 11. 27 5.7322 1. 7300 
1987 FR FRF 2 0.500 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -3.1290 
1987 IU IUF 2 0.847 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -5.5790 
1987 OH OHF 2 0.873 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 1. 083 3 
1987 KU KUF 2 0.723 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -5.4160 
1987 OS OSF 2 0.672 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 0.0000 
1987 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0333 11.27 3.0782 -0.7220 
1987 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0033 11. 27 3.0782 8.2727 
1987 PR PRF 2 0.563 0 0.0333 11. 27 3.0782 -0.6890 
1988 NC NCF 2 0.666 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -0.2080 
1988 MF MF 2 0.548 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -3.3490 
1988 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 4.5933 
1988 KS KSF 2 1. 514 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.3175 
1988 MN MNF 2 0.671 1 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 2.8186 
1988 PR PRF 2 0.563 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.0000 
1988 NR NRF 2 0.888 0 0.0333 11.61 3.4519 -5.0100 
1988 FR FRF 2 0.500 0 0.0333 11.61 3.4519 -2.6130 
1988 IS ISF 2 0.477 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -2.7880 
1988 NCS NCSF 2 0.795 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.9307 
1988 CL CLF 2 0.716 0 0.0196 11.61 3.4519 3.9266 
1988 p PF 2 1. 022 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.0000 
1988 WF WFF 2 0.897 0 0.0333 11.61 3.4519 -2.7560 
1988 MR MRF 2 0.651 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.0000 
1988 OS OSF 2 0.672 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -2.8180 
1988 GT GTF 2 0.928 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 1. 6928 
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1988 MI MIF 2 0.852 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 1. 4591 
1988 OH OHF 2 0.873 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.0000 
1988 IL ILF 2 1.000 0 0.0333 11.61 3.4519 -3.4450 
1988 D DF 2 0.939 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -2.8640 
1988 NU NUF 2 0.560 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -2.5050 
1988 SJ SJF 2 1.468 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 3.2862 
1988 WI WIF 2 1.169 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 2.5054 
1988 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0196 11.61 3.4519 1.1879 
1988 MIS MISF 2 1.136 0 0.0333 11.61 3.4519 -3.2700 
1988 PT PTF 2 0.822 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 2.0320 
1988 IN INF 2 0.775 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.0000 
1988 IU IUF 2 0.847 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 5.9139 
1988 KU KUF 2 0.723 1 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -2.2960 
1988 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0196 11. 61 3.4519 0.2088 
1988 BC BCF 2 0.989 0 0.0333 11. 61 3.4519 -3.7580 
1989 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.0000 
1989 PT PTF 2 0.822 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.5961 
1989 IN INF 2 0.775 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -0.6200 
1989 OH OHF 2 0.873 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 1.1592 
1989 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -2.4870 
1989 MF MF 2 0.548 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 2.0301 
1989 SJ SJF 2 1. 468 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.4660 
1989 FR FRF 2 0.500 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.3198 
1989 MIS MISF 2 1.136 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 1.9594 
1989 IL ILF 2 1.000 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.8694 
1989 NC NCF 2 0.666 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -0.3820 
1989 p PF 2 1. 022 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -2.3100 
1989 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -6.9550 
1989 D DF 2 0.939 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.8314 
1989 IU IUF 2 0.847 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -0.8690 
1989 KS KSF 2 1. 514 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -0.3200 
1989 CL CLF 2 0.716 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -4.6360 
1989 GT GTF 2 0.946 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -3.9030 
1989 WF WFF 2 0.897 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 2.3887 
1989 OS OSF 2 0.672 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -2.5290 
1989 IS ISF 2 0.477 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 2.2326 
1989 NR NRF 2 0.888 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 4.2152 
1989 MR MRF 2 0.651 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -5.0580 
1989 PR PRF 2 0.563 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -2.5290 
1989 MN MNF 2 0.671 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -3.4770 
1989 NU NUF 2 0.560 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.0000 
1989 WI WIF 2 1.169 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -1. 2640 
1989 MI MIBK 2 1. 044 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 1. 0517 
1989 KU KUF 2 0.723 0 0.0066 12.48 3.8219 0.0000 
1989 NCS NCSF 2 0.795 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -1.5700 
1989 BC BCF 2 0.989 0 0.0333 12.48 3.8219 -2.5290 
1990 KS KSF 2 1. 514 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.6250 
1990 MR MRF 2 0.651 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 5.3455 
1990 IS ISF 2 0.477 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -0.5700 
1990 NC NCF 2 0.666 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.0218 
1990 BC BCF 2 0.989 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -1.3360 
1990 WI WIF 2 1.169 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -5.3450 
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1990 IU IUF 2 0.847 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 1. 5750 
1990 WF WFF 2 0.897 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 0.7603 
1990 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -7.3500 
1990 V VF 2 1. 075 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 3.1181 
1990 OS OSF 2 0.672 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 4.4545 
1990 SJ SJF 2 1. 468 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -3.1620 
1990 KU KUF 2 0.723 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 1. 2250 
1990 PT PTF 2 0.822 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -6.1170 
1990 OH OHF 2 0.873 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -1. 2250 
1990 PR PRF 2 0.563 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -0.2220 
1990 MF MF 2 0.548 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 0.7920 
1990 p PF 2 1. 022 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -1. 2250 
1990 NU NUF 2 0.560 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -2.6720 
1990 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 1.6333 
1990 NR NRF 2 0.888 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -1. 2250 
1990 FR FRF 2 0.500 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.7222 
1990 MI MIF 2 0.852 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.2116 
1990 IL ILF 2 1.000 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -1. 9680 
1990 MIS MISF 2 1.136 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 0.0000 
1990 CL CLF 2 0.716 1 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.4500 
1990 NCS NCSF 2 0.795 1 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -0.2780 
1990 GT GTF 2 0.946 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 3.6355 
1990 D DF 2 0.939 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -0.6330 
1990 IN INF 2 0.775 0 0.0333 15.90 4.1743 -3.1500 
1990 MN MNF 2 0.671 0 0.0166 15.90 4.1743 2.4500 
1991 BC BCF 2 0.989 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.6473 
1991 OS OSF 2 0.672 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -1. 2130 
1991 OU OUF 2 0.657 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.4400 
1991 MIS MISF 2 1.136 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -0.2260 
1991 IN INF 2 0.775 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 4.6800 
1991 MI MIF 2 0.852 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.4260 
1991 p PF 2 1. 022 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 MF MF 2 0.548 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -0.1760 
1991 IL ILF 2 1.000 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.6000 
1991 KU KUF 2 0.723 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 4.8533 
1991 PR PRF 2 0.563 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.8679 
1991 KS KSF 2 1. 514 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.2640 
1991 GT GTF 2 0.946 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -0.1670 
1991 IU IUF 2 0.000 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.6000 
1991 PT PTF 2 0.822 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 3.8748 
1991 IS ISF 2 0.477 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 FR FRF 2 0.500 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.5280 
1991 WI WIF 2 1.169 0 0.0266 17.55 8.3289 1.3236 
1991 SJ SJF 2 1. 468 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.6030 
1991 MR MRF 2 0.651 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 D DF 2 0.939 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 NCS NCSF 2 0.795 1 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -2.3480 
1991 V VF 2 1.075 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.9781 
1991 NU NUF 2 0.560 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 6.6182 
1991 cs CSF 2 0.600 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -1. 0220 
1991 MN MNF 2 0. 671 1 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 WF WFF 2 0.897 0 0.0333 17.55 4.5389 -0.1480 
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1991 NR NRF 2 0.888 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 0.0000 
1991 NC NCF 2 0.666 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 1. 3 060 
1991 OH OHF 2 0.873 0 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 2.2150 
1991 CL CLF 2 0.716 1 0.0266 17.55 4.5389 1. 2133 
1982 OU OUK 3 0.357 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 2.2867 
1982 MIS MISK 3 0.897 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.5710 
1982 MI MIK 3 1. 029 0 0.0069 45.20 1. 2292 -0.2600 
1982 WF WFK 3 0.923 1 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -0.4020 
1982 MF MFK 3 0.487 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -1. 7150 
1982 SJ SJK 3 1.218 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 0.2541 
1982 KU KUK 3 0.539 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -1. 8420 
1982 PR PRK 3 0.574 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -1.1400 
1982 KS KSK 3 0.571 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 0.1006 
1982 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.7620 
1982 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.1770 
1982 NU NUK 3 0.560 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 0.1089 
1982 IS ISK 3 0.111 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -0.7350 
1982 NCS NCSK 3 0.806 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -1.1430 
1982 IN INK 3 0.561 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 0.1284 
1982 MR MRK 3 0.662 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -1. 4100 
1982 IL ILK 3 1. 237 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.7090 
1982 WI WIK 3 0.923 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 1. 2863 
1982 GT GTK 3 0.392 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 1. 6222 
1982 PT PTK 3 1.000 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -1. 24 70 
1982 FR FRK 3 0.378 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 3.1702 
1982 OH OHK 3 0.229 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 0.4288 
1982 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 0.0000 
1982 NC NCK 3 0.694 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -0.6230 
1982 cs CSK 3 0.100 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.1560 
1982 V VK 3 0.655 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -0.9360 
1982 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -1. 24 70 
1982 NR NRK 3 1.010 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 1. 7150 
1982 p PK 3 0.379 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -0.1960 
1982 MN MNK 3 0.714 0 0.0139 45.20 2.3982 -2.1430 
1982 BC BCK 3 0.705 0 0.0069 45.20 2.3982 -0.9800 
1983 NU NUK 3 0.560 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.1089 
1983 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.7620 
1983 SJ SJK 3 1. 218 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.2541 
1983 IL ILK 3 1. 237 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.7090 
1983 NC NCK 3 0.694 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.6230 
1983 MIS MISK 3 0.897 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.5710 
1983 PT PTK 3 1.000 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1. 24 70 
1983 IN INK 3 0.561 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.1284 
1983 cs CSK 3 0.100 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.1560 
1983 WI WIK 3 0.923 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 1. 2863 
1983 KU KUK 3 0.539 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1. 8420 
1983 MF MFK 3 0.487 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1. 7150 
1983 PR PRK 3 0.574 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1.1430 
1983 MR MRK 3 0.662 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1. 4100 
1983 NCS NCSK 3 0.806 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1.1430 
1983 OH OHK 3 0.229 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.4280 
1983 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0171 47.40 3.Q409 -0.1770 
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1983 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 0.0000 
1983 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -1. 2470 
1983 MN MNK 3 0.714 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -2.1430 
1983 p PK 3 0.379 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.1960 
1983 WF WFK 3 0.923 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.4020 
1983 OU OUK 3 0.357 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 2.2867 
1983 V VK 3 0.655 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.9360 
1983 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 1. 7150 
1983 MI MIK 3 1. 029 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.2600 
1983 BC BCK 3 0.705 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.9800 
1983 FR FRK 3 0.666 1 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.2602 
1983 GT GTK 3 0.392 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 1. 6222 
1983 IS ISK 3 0.111 0 0.0171 47.40 3.0409 -0.7350 
1983 KS KSK 3 0.571 0 0.0343 47.40 3.0409 0.1006 
1984 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -1. 9820 
1984 OU OUK 3 0.357 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.4406 
1984 IL ILK 3 1. 237 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.4120 
1984 KS KSK 3 0.571 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -2.2780 
1984 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 1. 5895 
1984 KU KUK 3 0.539 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.2410 
1984 MIS MISK 3 0.897 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.6058 
1984 V VK 3 0.655 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.8900 
1984 OH OHK 3 0.229 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -1. 8170 
1984 IS ISK 3 0.111 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.3860 
1984 MN MNK 3 0.714 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 2.5964 
1984 PT PTK 3 1. 000 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 0.0000 
1984 NU NUK 3 0.560 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.8438 
1984 PR PRK 3 0.574 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.6050 
1984 GT GTK 3 0.392 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.5792 
1984 IN INK 3 0.561 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.5712 
1984 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.2720 
1984 WI WIK 3 0.923 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 0.0000 
1984 BC BCK 3 0.705 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 1. 6617 
1984 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.3310 
1984 FR FRK 3 0.378 1 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -2.6900 
1984 SJ SJK 3 1.218 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.2693 
1984 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 0.0000 
1984 MI MIK 3 1. 029 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -1.4590 
1984 NCS NCSK 3 0.806 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 0.0000 
1984 WF WFK 3 0.923 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.6750 
1984 MR MRK 3 0.662 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.0660 
1984 MF MFK 3 0.487 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 1. 2117 
1984 NC NCK 3 0.694 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 0.6609 
1984 p PK 3 0.379 0 0.0202 53.33 3.6798 -0.4840 
1984 cs CSK 3 0 .1.00 0 0.0404 53.33 3.6798 2.4233 
1985 KS KSK 3 0.571 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.4172 
1985 MN MNK 3 0.714 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 2.3916 
1985 MIS MISK 3 0.897 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -1.9250 
1985 OH OHK 3 0.229 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 9250 
1985 MI MIK 3 0.000 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.6489 
1985 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -3.0330 
1985 MF MFK 3 0.487 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -2.5660 
95 
1985 p PK 3 0.379 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 5400 
1985 KU KUK 3 0.000 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 8421 
1985 PR PRK 3 0.574 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.8250 
1985 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -1.6500 
1985 NC NCK 3 0.694 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 2.3333 
1985 IS ISK 3 0.000 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -0.3600 
1985 V VK 3 0.655 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 2046 
1985 IN INK 3 0.561 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -0.8250 
1985 WF WFK 3 0.923 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.9009 
1985 IL ILK 3 0.000 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -1.3030 
1985 NU NUK 3 0.000 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -0.6730 
1985 GT GTK 3 0.392 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 3750 
1985 OU OUK 3 0.357 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.9676 
1985 FR FRK 3 0.378 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -0.3500 
1985 PT PTK 3 0.000 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.2655 
1985 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -0.7000 
1985 MR MRK 3 0.662 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 1. 0645 
1985 cs CSK 3 0.000 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 2.5667 
1985 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -2.3860 
1985 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -1. 4000 
1985 SJ SJK 3 0.000 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.5704 
1985 NCS NCSK 3 0.806 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 -1.6330 
1985 WI WIK 3 0.923 0 0.0101 67.66 4.3100 0.0000 
1985 BC BCK 3 0.705 0 0.0203 67.66 4.3100 0.1645 
1986 NU NUK 3 0.000 1 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -0.6280 
1986 FR FRK 3 0.378 0 0.0201 71. 40 4.9511 3.9250 
1986 GT GTK 3 0.392 0 0.0201 71. 40 4.9511 1.0092 
1986 WI WIK 3 0.923 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -2.5810 
1986 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 0.3532 
1986 V VK 3 0.655 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 2.1000 
1986 NCS NCSK 3 0.806 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 0.0000 
1986 SJ SJK 3 0.000 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -1.3350 
1986 IL ILK 3 0.000 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 -1.1660 
1986 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 -1.2840 
1986 NC NCK 3 0.694 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 0.7850 
1986 p PK 3 0.379 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -2.1250 
1986 MR MRK 3 0.662 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -1.1530 
1986 OU OUK 3 0.357 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -0.1420 
1986 IN INK 3 0.561 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 -1.2930 
1986 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0201 71.40 4.9511 1. 7127 
1986 MN MNK 3 0.714 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -1. 1770 
1986 KS KSK 3 0.571 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 0.1624 
1986 MIS MISK 3 0.897 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 3.1400 
1986 BC BCK 3 0.705 0 0.0201 71.40 4.9511 0.5607 
1986 IS ISK 3 0.000 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 -0.3140 
1986 PR PRK 3 0.574 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 1. 7127 
1986 MI MIK 3 0.000 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -0.0280 
1986 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0333 71.40 4.9511 -0.3360 
1986 MF MFK 3 0.487 0 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -1. 5700 
1986 WF WFK 3 0.923 1 0.0333 71. 40 4.9511 -1.5800 
1986 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 2.4478 
1986 cs CSK 3 0.000 0 0.0100 71. 40 4.9511 -3.4960 
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1986 PT PTK 3 0.000 0 0.0333 71.40 4.9511 -1. 2100 
1986 OH OHK 3 0.229 0 0.0100 71.40 4.9511 0.0000 
1986 KU KUK 3 0.000 0 0.0100 71.40 4.9511 0.7273 
1987 IN INK 3 0.842 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 2.2500 
1987 PR PRK 3 0.816 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 0.0000 
1987 p PK 3 0.655 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1.9583 
1987 SJ SJK 3 1. 250 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -0.3230 
1987 KU KUK 3 0.565 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1.7255 
1987 IS ISK 3 0.122 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 0.8368 
1987 MF MFK 3 0.463 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 2.1667 
1987 V VK 3 0.935 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -3.1990 
1987 OU OUK 3 0.285 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -1. 7560 
1987 FR FRK 3 0.666 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -1.2800 
1987 MI MIK 3 1. 044 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -0.6190 
1987 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -1. 0260 
1987 MIS MISK 3 1.117 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1. 0833 
1987 cs CSK 3 0.116 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -3.8400 
1987 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1. 3929 
1987 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1.7727 
1987 MN MNK 3 0.471 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1. 3542 
1987 NU NUK 3 0.573 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1. 3000 
1987 MR MRK 3 0.511 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -0.6330 
1987 GT GTK 3 0.988 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 0.7338 
1987 OH OHK 3 0.689 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -3.2500 
1987 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 0.0000 
1987 NC NCK 3 1. 055 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -3.8400 
1987 KS KSK 3 1. 685 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 0.4333 
1987 NCS NCSK 3 0.956 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 2.3636 
1987 IL ILK 3 1. 250 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -0.4330 
1987 BC BCK 3 0.957 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -2.6300 
1987 WF WFK 3 1. 092 1 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -3.9360 
1987 PT PTK 3 1. 016 0 0.0333 75.13 5.5922 -2.3630 
1987 WI WIK 3 1. 076 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 5.6875 
1987 NR NRK 3 1.010 0 0.0033 75.13 5.5922 1. 6250 
1988 WI WIK 3 1. 076 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -4.3060 
1988 MN MNK 3 0.471 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 1.1483 
1988 BC BCK 3 0.957 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -1.1710 
1988 OH OHK 3 0.689 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.0000 
1988 CL CLK 3 0.197 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 2.7142 
1988 NR NRK 3 1.010 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -3.4450 
1988 MIS MISK 3 1.117 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -3.4450 
1988 p PK 3 0.655 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -1. 3750 
1988 cs CSK 3 0.116 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 3.4450 
1988 KS KSK 3 1. 685 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 1. 5410 
1988 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 1. 2527 
1988 NC NCK 3 1.055 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -1. 2520 
1988 MI MIK 3 1. 044 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.7832 
1988 SJ SJK 3 1. 250 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 1. 8814 
1988 FR FRK 3 0.666 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -3.7580 
1988 V VK 3 0.935 1 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -1.1380 
1988 GT GTK 3 0.988 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -3.2380 
1988 NU NUK 3 0.573 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.0416 
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1988 MF MFK 3 0.463 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 2.2967 
1988 OU OUK 3 0.285 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.0438 
1988 IL ILK 3 1. 250 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 2.1654 
1988 PR PRK 3 0.816 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 2.9230 
1988 IN INK 3 0.842 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 1. 4764 
1988 MR MRK 3 0.511 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -0.0920 
1988 KU KUK 3 0.565 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -2.7970 
1988 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -1. 8700 
1988 IS !SK 3 0.122 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.6853 
1988 PT PTK 3 1. 016 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 0.0000 
1988 NCS NCSK 3 0.956 0 0.0333 77.40 6.2349 -2.5050 
1988 WF WFK 3 1. 092 1 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 2.8510 
1988 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0196 77.40 6.2349 3.1116 
1989 NU NUK 3 0.573 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -3.0180 
1989 OH OHK 3 0.689 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 4.4710 
1989 OS OSK 3 0.000 1 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 0.9273 
1989 KU KUK 3 0.565 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 0.2230 
1989 FR FRK 3 0.666 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 4.0043 
1989 MF MFK 3 0.463 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -2.3180 
1989 OU OUK 3 0.285 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 2.6645 
1989 IS ISK 3 0.122 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -0.2120 
1989 p PK 3 0.655 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 0.1955 
1989 MN MNK 3 0.471 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -1.9870 
1989 D DK 3 1.010 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 91.0470 
1989 MR MRK 3 0.511 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 0.6978 
1989 PR PRK 3 0.816 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -1.6860 
1989 IL ILK 3 1. 250 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -2.0510 
1989 PT PTK 3 1. 016 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1. 2645 
1989 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1.1178 
1989 cs CSK 3 0.116 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -0.6320 
1989 KS KSK 3 1. 685 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1. 2537 
1989 SJ SJK 3 1. 250 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -0.2390 
1989 MI MIF 3 0.852 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -1.0090 
1989 V VK 3 0.935 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 2.0808 
1989 IN INK 3 0.842 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -2.4830 
1989 CL CLK 3 0.000 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 0.0000 
1989 NCS NCSK 3 0.956 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -5.0580 
1989 WF WFK 3 1. 092 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -1.7470 
1989 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0333 83.20 6.8739 -2.2430 
1989 WI WIK 3 1.076 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 3.1049 
1989 NC NCK 3 1.055 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1. 2640 
1989 MIS MISK 3 1.117 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1.1592 
1989 GT GTK 3 0.988 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 1. 7884 
1989 BC BCK 3 0.957 0 0.0066 83.20 6.8739 2.4516 
1990 MN MNK 3 0.471 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -0.7580 
1990 MIS MISK 3 1.117 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1.2250 
1990 WI WIK 3 1. 076 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -3.1500 
1990 BC BCK 3 0.957 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -2.1770 
1990 WF WFK 3 1. 092 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1.8278 
1990 cs CSK 3 0.116 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1.3363 
1990 MR MRK 3 0.511 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 0.0164 
1990 FR FRK 3 0.666 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1.2250 
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1990 V VK 3 0.935 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -0.2110 
1990 IL ILK 3 1. 250 1 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 2.3710 
1990 SJ SJK 3 1.250 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 2.4956 
1990 IS ISK 3 0.122 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1. 6924 
1990 NC NCK 3 1. 055 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -2.6720 
1990 KS KSK 3 1. 685 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1.4980 
1990 PT PTK 3 1. 016 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1.3360 
1990 MF MFK 3 0.463 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1. 2250 
1990 PR PRK 3 0.816 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1. 7818 
1990 NU NUK 3 0.573 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1. 4082 
1990 NCS NCSK 3 0.956 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 0.0000 
1990 D DK 3 1.010 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -93.5000 
1990 p PK 3 0.655 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1.6080 
1990 IN INK 3 0.842 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1. 5094 
1990 OU OUK 3 0.285 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -0.9420 
1990 KU KUK 3 0.565 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1. 4350 
1990 NR NRK 3 1.010 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 2.1000 
1990 CL CLK 3 0.000 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 0.0000 
1990 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 1.4700 
1990 IU IUK 3 0.882 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 0.0000 
1990 GT GTK 3 0.988 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -0.4900 
1990 MI MIK 3 1. 044 0 0.0333 106.00 7.4953 -1. 4530 
1990 OH OHK 3 0.689 0 0.0166 106.00 7.4953 0.0000 
1991 NU NUK 3 0.573 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.0000 
1991 D DK 3 1. 010 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.9265 
1991 KS KSK 3 1.685 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -1.4860 
1991 MI MIK 3 1.044 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.4181 
1991 OH OHK 3 0.689 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.0000 
1991 PT PTK 3 1. 016 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -1. 3230 
1991 NC NCK 3 1. 055 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 3.3091 
1991 FR FRK 3 0.666 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -2.7570 
1991 MR MRK 3 0.511 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.3267 
1991 GT GTK 3 0.988 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 1. 8409 
1991 OU OUK 3 0.285 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.3467 
1991 SJ SJK 3 i".250 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.5630 
1991 CL CLK 3 0.209 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 0.0000 
1991 MF MFK 3 0.463 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -0.5650 
1991 MIS MISK 3 1.117 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -5.5150 
1991 IL ILK 3 1.250 1 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -1. 8960 
1991 PR PRK 3 0.816 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -5.7350 
1991 V VK 3 0.935 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -1.6590 
1991 NCS NCSK 3 0.956 0 0.0266 117 .. 00 7.1289 6.6182 
1991 IN INK 3 0.842 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -20.1400 
1991 MN MNK 3 0.471 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 1. 7911 
1991 KU KUK 3 0.565 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 3.3611 
1991 p PK 3 0.655 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -0.0560 
1991 WF WFK 3 1. 092 0 0.0333 117.00 4.5389 -0.7700 
1991 NR NRK 3 1. 010 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -4.5640 
1991 IS ISK 3 0.122 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -3.3350 
1991 BC BCK 3 0.957 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -1. 77iO 
1991 OS OSK 3 0.000 0 0.0266 117.00 7.1289 2.4267 
1991 cs CSK 3 0.116 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -6.7280 
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1991 IU !UK 3 0.882 0 0.0333 117.00 7.1289 -4.0920 






Jill S. Harris 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
CHEATING IN THE NCAA: A MODEL OF CRIME IN 
SPORTS ADMINISTRATION 
Major Field: Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: 
Born in Loma Linda, California, on July 15, 1965, 
the daughter of L.E. and Sharon Barnes. 
Education: 
Cajon High School, San Bernardino, California, 
(1983) 
Bachelor of Arts (Economics), California State 
University at San Bernardino (1987) 
Master of Arts (Financial Economics) University of 
California at Riverside (1988) 
Completed requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State 
University in July 1995 
Professional Experience: 
Adjunct Instructor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, August, 1994 to present. 
Adjunct Instructor, Chapman University, August, 
1994 to present. 
Adjunct Instructor, Phillips University, March, 
1989 to May, 1993. 
Teaching Assistant, Oklahoma State University, 
September, 1989 to May 1993. 
Grain Merchandiser, Union Equity Cooperative 
Exchange, June, 1990 to March 1991. 
Professional Affiliations: 
American Economic Association 
Southern Economic Association 
Date: 04-25-95 
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW 
IRB#: BU-95-026 
Proposal Title: CHEA TING IN THE NCAA: A MODEL OF CRIME IN SPORTS 
ADMINISTRATION 
Principal Investigator(s): Edward 0. Price, Jill S. Harris 
Reviewed and Processed as: Exempt 
Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): None 
APPROVAL STATUS SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY FULL INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD AT 
NEXT MEETING. 
APPROVAL STATUS PERIOD VALID FOR ONE CALENDAR YEAR AFTER WIIlCH A 
CONTINUATION OR RENEW AL REQUEST IS REQUIRED TO BE SUBMITTED FOR BOARD 
APPROVAL. 
ANY MODIFICATIONS TO APPROVED PROJECT MUST ALSO BE SUBMITTED FOR 
APPROVAL. 
Comments, Modifications/Conditions for Approval or Reasons for Deferral or Disapproval 
are as follows: 
IF THE APPLICATION HAD BEEN SUBMITTED IN A TIMELY MANNER IT 
WOULD HA VE BEEN APPROVED AS EXEMPT. 
Signature: Date: April 27. 1995 
Chairo 
